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STOPS AND STARES: STREET STOPS, 
SURVEILLANCE, AND RACE IN THE NEW 
POLICING* 
Jeffrey Fagan,** Anthony A. Braga,*** Rod K. Brunson,**** and April 
Pattavina***** 
ABSTRACT 
The use of proactive tactics to disrupt criminal activities, such as 
Terry street stops and concentrated misdemeanor arrests, are 
essential to the “new policing.”  This model applies complex metrics, 
strong management, and aggressive enforcement and surveillance to 
focus policing on high crime risk persons and places.  The tactics 
endemic to the “new policing” gave rise in the 1990s to popular, legal, 
political, and social science concerns about disparate treatment of 
minority groups in their everyday encounters with law enforcement.  
Empirical evidence showed that minorities were indeed stopped and 
arrested more frequently than similarly situated Whites, even when 
controlling for local social and crime conditions. In this Article, we 
examine racial disparities under a unique configuration of the street 
stop prong of the “new policing”—the inclusion of non-contact 
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observations (or surveillances) in the field interrogation and 
observation activity of Boston Police Department officers.  We show 
that Boston Police officers focus significant portions of their field 
investigation activity in two areas: suspected and actual gang 
members, and the city’s high crime areas.  Minority neighborhoods 
experience higher levels of field interrogation and surveillance 
activity, controlling for crime and other social factors.  Relative to 
White suspects, Black suspects are more likely to be observed, 
interrogated, and frisked or searched controlling for gang 
membership and prior arrest history.  Moreover, relative to their 
Black counterparts, White police officers conduct high numbers of 
field investigations and are more likely to frisk or search subjects of 
all races.  We distinguish between preference-based and statistical 
discrimination by comparing stops by officer-suspect racial pairs.  If 
officer activity is independent of officer race, we would infer that 
disproportionate stops of minorities reflect statistical discrimination.  
We show instead that officers seem more likely to investigate and 
frisk or search a minority suspect if officer and suspect race differ.  
We locate these results in the broader tensions of racial profiling that 
pose recurring social and constitutional concerns in the “new 
policing.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
A.  The New Policing 
In an essay published in 2000 in the Fordham Urban Law Journal, 
Professor Philip Heymann credited the “new policing” for the sharp 
crime declines of the preceding decade.1  Three essential features 
characterized the “new policing.”  First, police innovators developed 
real-time policing metrics both for internal personnel management 
and to inform how and where police are deployed across their 
respective cities.2  They noted the importance of the strategic 
concentration of police resources in the city’s highest crime areas 
based on new methods of crime mapping and analysis.3  Second, these 
metrics were used to hold local police commanders accountable for 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. See Phillip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 411, 
413–14 (2000).  A few years before, Professor Debra Livingston had summarized this 
vector of tactics that comprised the “new policing” in a 1997 essay, but stopped short 
of crediting the police for producing the crime decline across cities. Debra Livingston, 
Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and 
the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 672 (1997). 
 2. Heymann, supra note 1, at 429–32. 
 3. David Weisburd et al., Reforming to Preserve: Comp Stat and Strategic 
Problem Solving in American Policing, 2 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 421, 440–41 
(2003) [hereinafter Weisburd et al., Reforming to Preserve].  For early experiments 
on metrics-driven proactive policing, see generally Lawrence W. Sherman & David 
Weisburd, General Deterrent Effects of Police Patrol in Crime “Hot Spots”: A 
Randomized, Controlled Trial, 12 JUST. Q. 625 (1995); Edward McGarrell et al., 
Reducing Firearms Violence Through Directed Police Patrol, 1 CRIMINOLOGY & 
PUB. POL’Y 119–148 (2001–02); David Weisburd et al., The Possible “Backfire” 
Effects of Hot Spots Policing: An Experimental Assessment of Impacts on 
Legitimacy, Fear and Collective Efficacy, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 297 
(2011). 
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crime trends in their precincts.4  Failure to lower crime rates resulted 
in a form of public shaming in meetings of high-level police 
executives, and possibly demotion and re-assignment.5  
Accountability and heightened management control were essential 
tools to incentivize commanders to closely watch and react to local 
crime conditions. 
The third new policing tool was the use of proactive tactics to 
disrupt criminal activities.  Aggressive street stops were one of the 
tactics highlighted by both Livingston and Heymann.6  They and 
others7 discussed the new police focus on order maintenance and the 
aggressive enforcement of quality-of-life crimes,8 on the enforcement 
of minor crimes as a way to suppress more serious crimes, on stop and 
frisk tactics to disrupt crimes and especially to seize weapons, and on 
new developments in community policing that brought police into 
closer collaborative relationships with citizens.9 
Decades earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court had expanded the legal 
boundaries under which police could conduct field interrogations, or 
street stops, in a 1968 decision, Terry v. Ohio.10  Terry permitted 
temporary stops and detentions based on reasonable suspicion that 
crime was “afoot,” supplanting the more demanding probable cause 
standard11 and memorializing police discretion as the gateway to 
                                                                                                                                         
 4. WILLIAM BRATTON & PETER KNOBLER, THE TURNAROUND: HOW AMERICA’S 
TOP COP REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC (1998). 
 5. JOHN F. TIMONEY, BEAT COP TO TOP COP: A TALE OF THREE CITIES 168–69 
(2010). 
 6. Livingston, supra note 1, at 571. 
 7. See, e.g., GEORGE KELLING & CATHERINE COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS 
(1996); Anthony A. Braga et al., The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime, 31 
JUST. Q. 633, 658–60 (2014); David Thacher, Order Maintenance Reconsidered: 
Moving Beyond Strong Causal Reasoning, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381, 392–
94 (2004). 
 8. See supra note 7. The policy also focused intensively on misdemeanor drug 
crimes, especially marijuana possession, as part of the “Broken Windows” strategy.  
Part of the logic of such enforcement was also to find more serious criminal offenders 
among those committing such minor crimes.  See generally JACK MAPLE & CHRIS 
MITCHELL, THE CRIME FIGHTER: HOW YOU CAN MAKE YOUR CRIME FREE (2000).  
Maple and Mitchell claimed that marijuana arrests would prevent more serious 
crimes since marijuana smokers were criminals “on their day off.” Id. at 155. 
 9. See supra note 7. 
 10. 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968) (holding that “[t]he reasonableness of any particular 
search and seizure must be assessed in light of the particular 
circumstances . . . [against the standard of whether] a man of reasonable caution is 
warranted in believing that the action taken was appropriate.”); see also infra Part II 
and accompanying notes. 
 11. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 366–67 (2003) (reaffirming the probable 
cause standard under the Fourth Amendment to justify a “search and seizure”). 
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street stops.12  Subsequent decisions further expanded the tolerances 
around the concept of “reasonable suspicion.”13  The “new policing” 
embraced the use of street stops as a critical tool to disrupt criminal 
activity, despite the absence of any evidence of the comparative 
advantage of street stops over other policing tactics.14 
Proactivity was the animating theory of the “new policing,” 
whether in the context of data-driven management metrics such as 
CompStat,15 a computerized crime accounting system, the aggressive 
use of arrests for minor crimes, or the conduct of street stops at the 
first signs of suspicious behavior.16  In the current era, the term was 
first used without fanfare by Professors Jerome Skolnick and David 
Bayley in their description of policing innovations in the 1980s.17  
New York City police first used proactive policies to disrupt open-air 
drug markets starting in the early 1990s.18 
Over time, proactivity became a broad umbrella for a wide range of 
police tactics.  One study defines “proactive policing” as the vigorous 
enforcement of law against minor (misdemeanor) offenses.19  Other 
studies mention the use of stop and frisk, or investigative stops, as 
central to a proactive policing policy.20  Still others portray a curious 
admixture of drug enforcement and community policing as 
                                                                                                                                         
 12. See generally Terry, 392 U.S. 1. 
 13. See infra Part II and accompanying notes. 
 14. A decade later, the National Research Council policing panel conspicuously 
avoided the question of what police should do once they got to the targeted places.  
However, a recent systematic review and meta-analysis of the effects of hot spots 
policing on crime suggests that community problem-solving approaches generated 
stronger crime reduction impacts relative to increased enforcement efforts. See Braga 
et al., supra note 7, at 633. 
 15. Weisburd et al., Reforming to Preserve, supra note 3, at 424.  Many police 
departments adopted elements of the “new policing” without incorporating the 
metrics-driven management algorithms for targeting and assessment of police actions.  
In fact, the authors critique management metrics as retarding organization reform 
and reinforcing the paramilitary model of police innovation. Id. 
 16. Id. at 427. 
 17. See generally JEROME SKOLNICK & DAVID BAYLEY, THE NEW BLUE LINE: 
POLICE INNOVATION IN SIX AMERICAN CITIES (1986) (discussing a shift in police 
tactics from being reactive to crime complaints toward acting in response to chronic 
criminal problems in specific places). 
 18. Lynn Zimmer, Proactive Policing Against Street-Level Drug Trafficking, 9 
AM. J. POL’Y 43, 52–55 (1990). 
 19. Charis Kubrin et al., Proactive Policing and Robbery Rates Across U.S. Cities, 
48 CRIMINOLOGY 57, 57 (2010). 
 20. JEFFREY FAGAN ET AL., Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The 
Logic and Demography of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City, in RACE, 
ETHNICITY, AND POLICING 309 (Stephen Rice & Michael White eds., 2010). 
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“proactive.”21  Accordingly, there is no consensus on what constitutes 
“proactive policing” other than its emphasis on anticipation of 
criminal activity and directing action to those places or persons, and 
its commitment to systematic criminal enforcement of minor crimes.22 
Tactics such as investigative stops (stop and frisk, or Terry stops), 
order maintenance and aggressive responses to quality of life 
enforcement, the same tactics cited by Livingston, are basic to many 
conceptions of proactive policing, and are the focus of this Article.23 
B.  Policing Crime, Policing Race 
The metrics of the “new policing” pointed to the neighborhoods 
with the highest crime rates as the targets of police activity. These 
usually were the places with concentrated poverty and often were 
minority neighborhoods.24  At first glance, this seems a rational and 
proportional response, consistent with most benchmarking strategies 
to assess fairness or bias.25  Yet, regardless of the distribution and 
allocation function to assign police to neighborhoods—a linear 
allocation of police to neighborhoods based on differences in their 
crime rates, for example—disproportionate allocations raise both 
                                                                                                                                         
 21. Jon Gould & Stephen Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police 
Behavior Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 315, 318 
(2004). 
 22. The original “broken windows” essay, whose ideas informed much of the next 
decade of proactive policing, suggested that arrest was a last resort if other efforts 
failed to ameliorate the disorderly conditions that invited crime. See George L. 
Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, 
ATLANTIC (March 1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/
broken-windows/304465/ [https://perma.cc/LW3A-6JHA].  By 2000, Kelling had 
embraced the notion of using arrest authority systematically and aggressively to stop 
minor crime from growing into more serious crime patterns and problems. See 
KELLING & COLES, supra note 7, at 108–156. 
 23. Livingston, supra note 1, at 554–58. 
 24. Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, 
Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 462 (2000); see 
Lauren J. Krivo et al., Segregation, Racial Structure, and Neighborhood Violent 
Crime, 114 AM. J. SOC. 1765, 1765–1802 (2009); see also ROBERT SAMPSON & 
JEFFREY MORENOFF, DURABLE INEQUALITY: SPATIAL DYNAMICS, SOCIAL PROCESSES 
AND THE PERSISTENCE OF POVERTY IN CHICAGO NEIGHBORHOODS 176 (Samuel 
Bowles et al. eds., 2006). 
 25. See Greg Ridgeway & John MacDonald, Methods for Assessing Racially 
Biased Policing, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL 
READINGS 180 (Stephen Rice & Michael White eds., 2010); Jeffrey Fagan, Law, 
Social Science, and Racial Profiling, 4 JUST. RES. AND POL’Y 104 (2002); Ian Ayres, 
Outcome Tests of Racial Disparities in Police Practices, 4 J. JUST. RES. & STAT. ASS’N 
131 (2002); see also Lawrence Rosenthal, The Crime Drop and the Fourth 
Amendment: Toward an Empirical Jurisprudence of Search and Seizure, 29 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 641 (2004). 
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fairness and efficiency questions.26  In such instances, minority 
citizens are exposed to “more” policing than their crime conditions 
would dictate, and persons in other neighborhoods placed at risk due 
to under- or de-policing of their neighborhoods.27 
Assuming limits on the effectiveness of police in an area—after all, 
there is only so much crime to go around—then over-policing risks 
adverse consequences from unnecessary and unproductive police 
contacts.28  And since these stops are neither pleasant nor without 
consequences,29 allocations framed this way raise constitutional 
questions of disparate treatment.30  The persistence of these errors in 
the context of the extensive use of noxious tactics suggests that these 
practices and disparities took on the characteristics of a government 
program rather than the exercise of individual officers’ judgment and 
discretion.31 
Court rulings often skirt the question of whether bias is the 
dynamic that produces disparities, preferring instead to examine 
discriminatory intent.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause forbids state actors from denying the equal 
protection of the law.32 Intentional discrimination by race is the 
standard, not simply whether a policy or practice has a 
disproportionate racial impact.33  Whether that intent is a matter of 
bias or preferences is not central to a legal determination. Intent, 
instead, is the predicate to determine discrimination.  Courts have 
developed standards to establish discriminatory intent that would 
                                                                                                                                         
 26. See supra note 25. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See Tom R. Tyler, Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda B. Geller, Street Stops and 
Police Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization, 
11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 758 (2014); Amanda Geller, Jeffrey Fagan & Tom 
R. Tyler, Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young Urban Men, 104 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH 2121, 2121 (2014). 
 30. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see 
also Jeffrey Fagan, Greg Conyers & Ian Ayres, No Runs, Few Hits and Many Errors: 
Street Stops, Bias and Proactive Policing (2014) (unpublished conference draft) (on 
file with author). 
 31. TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC 
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002); RONALD WEITZER & STEVEN 
TUCH, RACE AND POLICING IN AMERICA: CONFLICT AND REFORM (2006); David 
Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 
84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 267–68 (1999); Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: 
Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 164–65 (2015). 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 33. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976). 
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satisfy an equal protection claim, such as intentionally classifying 
persons by race for differential treatment.34  The standard most 
applicable for contemporary policing is an “as applied” 
determination: that a seemingly neutral policy is applied in an 
intentionally discriminatory manner.35  Courts have argued that an 
equal protection claim is satisfied by evidence of a discriminatory 
“purpose” as a “motivating factor” for the practice under scrutiny.36  
The question of bias is secondary to the question of the complex task 
of discerning discriminatory intent.  In the case of a widespread 
program37 of Terry or street stops, an intentionally disproportionate 
application of the stop authority to persons of one race—with perhaps 
deliberate indifference to these patterns—raises the specter of 
intent.38 
Still, there remain several empirical challenges to detecting bias in 
the institutional practices of law enforcement agencies and in the 
actions of individual police officers.  Control groups, benchmarks to 
assess proportionality, endogeneity of crime and policing, varying 
spatial boundaries, individual biases versus institutional practices, 
police-citizen interpersonal interactions, characteristics of officers and 
the composition of both the civilian and police populations, multiple 
outcomes of stops and processes within stops, and several important 
contextual factors all contribute to the challenges facing researchers.  
All these parameters are basic to design decisions in assessing the 
extent of police discrimination. We address these challenges in the 
empirical project reported in this Article. 
                                                                                                                                         
 34. See, e.g., Brown v. Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 333–34 (2d Cir. 2000) (permitting a 
racial classification for police only when police are pursuing a person meeting a 
specific suspect description).  Normally, all such classifications are evaluated at the 
highest standard of “strict scrutiny.”  See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 
505 (2005) (holding that “all racial classification” imposed by government “must be 
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 
11 (1967). 
 35. See, e.g., Brown, 221 F. 3d at 337; see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 
373–74 (1886). 
 36. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252, 265–66 (1977) (“Because discriminatory intent is rarely susceptible to direct 
proof, litigants may make “a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct 
evidence of intent as may be available. The impact of the official action—whether it 
bears more heavily on one race than another—may provide an important starting 
point.”). 
 37. Meares, supra note 31, at 164–65. 
 38. Id. 
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C.  Stops and Stares: The Surveillance Prong of the “New Policing” 
In this Article, we examine the extent of racial disparities under a 
unique configuration of the street stop prong of the “new policing”—
the use of Field Interrogation, Observation, Frisk and/or Search 
(BPD form 2487; hereafter, FIO) reports by the Boston Police 
Department (BPD).  As in many other big cities, the Boston FIO 
strategy included the basic element of investigative stops or field 
interrogations as a staple of its proactive tactics. 
Beyond this core tactic, however, two additional components 
distinguish the Boston design from most forms of the “new policing.”  
First, Boston officers conduct non-contact observations of known 
criminal offenders or others gathering in known crime locations.  
Officers are required to complete FIO reports for both in-person 
encounters and non-contact observations. Officers are required to 
enter the information from non-contact observations or surveillance 
in the same databases that house data from field interrogations (or 
investigative stops).39  Department policy requires that observations 
be more than a stakeout or a hunch.  That is, the observation must be 
specific to a suspected crime, rather than general surveillance of 
individuals.40 
Second, the policy explicitly recognizes the role of surveillance and 
intelligence-gathering in the local strategy.41  Surveillance of known 
offenders, their associates, and their gathering places “plays an 
important part in the department’s intelligence efforts to collect and 
disseminate data on the activities and whereabouts of known and 
suspected criminals and their associates in the city.”42  In effect, the 
strategy allows the department to build a network database of the 
movements and associations of individuals through time and space in 
                                                                                                                                         
 39. See, e.g., Bos. Police Dep’t, Special Order SO 05-023, June 3, 2005, § 1 (“An 
officer should . . . complete an FIOFS report whenever (a) he/she observes an 
individual who [sic] the officer knows to have a criminal record.”). 
 40. Id. at § 4 (noting that “[a]n officer shall complete an FIOFS report whenever: 
(a) he/she observes, detains, or interrogates a person suspected of unlawful 
design . . . .  The officer must enter the type of crime suspected . . . . [I]t is not 
sufficient to simply enter ‘suspicious person’ or ‘SP.’”); see also Bos. Police Dep’t, 
Rules and Procedures, Rule 323, § 5 (March 9, 2011). 
 41. Special Order SO-5-023, at § 1(stating that “[t]he FIOFS report has been 
prepared so that the department may accumulate up-to-date information concerning 
known criminals and their associates, the vehicles they use, the places they frequent, 
and persons suspected of unlawful design”). 
 42. Id. at General Considerations. 
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the city. The observations also are considered documentary evidence 
and therefore admissible if relevant in any future proceedings.43 
Few police departments have acknowledged the potential for 
intelligence-gathering that is created from Terry stops, much less how 
the data could be aggregated and analyzed for that purpose. Even 
fewer acknowledge the Fourth Amendment implications on privacy 
and anonymity.44  While intelligence-gathering is not unusual in 
policing in response to known crime groups such as street gangs or 
drug selling organizations,45 the transformation of Terry stops into an 
intelligence regime seems new.  While surveillance of individuals or 
gangs is permissible, surveillance without a warrant for places and 
persons wandering through them raises constitutional concerns.46 
Pretextual stops made on thin grounds for reasonable suspicion can 
create opportunities to record time-place-network activities of 
suspected offenders or other valued targets such as gang members or 
drug traffickers. Surveillance without contact is another matter.47  
Recorded observations by officers who have knowledge of the 
identity and affiliations of that target can in effect double down on 
the information gathered through in-person contacts.48  These non-
contact observations can in fact lead to further contacts, assuming 
                                                                                                                                         
 43. Bos. Police Dep’t, Rules and Procedures, Rule 323, § 2. 
 44. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT 
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 79 (2007) (discussing the elasticity of 
the reasonable suspicion prong of Fourth Amendment doctrine to accommodate 
contemporary surveillance practices by police of gang members and others suspected 
of potential criminal participation). 
 45. See William Bloss, Escalating U.S. Surveillance After 9/11: An Examination 
of Causes and Effects, 4 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 208 (2002) (documenting the 
expansion of police surveillance in response to perceived threats from crime, drug 
selling and national security concerns); see also Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering, 
the Court, and Some Realism about Police Patrol, 199 SUP. CT. REV. 141, 144 (1999) 
(expressing concern that granting police authority to focus on public spaces can 
evolve into policing as an instrument for surveillance and harassment of “disfavored” 
individuals or groups). 
 46. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (finding that there is no 
Fourth Amendment violation when evidence is obtained without “physical entrance 
into the area”); Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: 
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801 (2004).  But 
see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001) (holding that the use of a 
thermal imaging device from a public position to monitor the radiation of heat from a 
person’s home was a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, and thus required a 
warrant). 
 47. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing and the War on 
Drugs, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571 (2003); Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda B. Geller, Following 
the Script, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51 (2015). 
 48. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 47; Fagan & Geller, Following the Script, supra 
note 47. 
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usable intelligence that can be linked to specific persons or groups.49  
For example, the U.S. Customs Service, under former NYPD 
Commissioner Raymond Kelly, used “intelligence developed by 
another officer” to target persons for later administrative searches.50 
The observational or intelligence components of the “new 
policing” have received little attention in either legal or empirical 
scholarship on policing, or on the constitutional implications of these 
types of “passive” stops.  Certainly, there are Fourth Amendment 
implications when police use prior suspicionless observations as a 
partial basis for a later interdiction that risks arrest and its 
aftermath.51  Chicago’s constitutional troubles in the 1990s with its 
gang loitering ordinance show the difficult line that police face when 
determining when to escalate observation of non-criminal conduct 
such as loitering into reasonable suspicion of a crime that would 
justify a coercive stop.52  If there is no notice to citizens about what 
conduct might authorize police attention, it may be equally unclear to 
the police. 
There also are distinct Equal Protection implications when 
individuals are disproportionately targeted by race for observations 
that can lead to more intrusive or coercive police actions in the short 
term.53  Racial disparities in this passive component of the new 
policing would be compounded in subsequent police contacts, given 
the leveraging of intelligence into further stop activity.54  The deeper 
                                                                                                                                         
 49. Because there is no seizure of the subject, Terry’s ground rules for street 
detentions may not be applicable to non-contact observations.  Yet observations can 
be bootstrapped by police officers into information that can serve as the basis for the 
reasonable suspicion that Terry requires. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1968). 
 50. Jerome Skolnick & Abigail Caplovits, Guns, Drugs and Profiling, 43 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 413, 433–34 (2001) (citing UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
BETTER TARGETING OF AIRLINE PASSENGERS FOR PERSONAL SEARCHES COULD 
PRODUCE BETTER RESULTS, GAO/GGD-00-38, 87, at 5–6, 16 (2000)). 
 51. See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 908 (Mass. 2011).  Cruz was 
ordered to exit a vehicle when police officers spotted it parked next to a fire hydrant 
and then smelled marijuana smoke.  Possession of small amounts of marijuana had 
been decriminalized in Massachusetts since 2008.  Cruz had fallen under the police 
gaze in this instance because of his prior encounters with police, and those encounters 
heightened their suspicion leading to the search of the vehicle for what amounts to a 
civil infraction. See also David Keenan & Tina M. Thomas, An Offense-Severity 
Model for Stop and Frisks, 123 YALE L.J. 1448, 1458–60 (2014). 
 52. Chicago v. Morales, 521 U.S 41, 55–57 (1999) (holding that a gang loitering 
ordinance is vague as to what behaviors would be actionable for police and therefore 
encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement); see Livingston, Gang 
Loitering, supra note 45, at 163 and accompanying text. 
 53. Jeffrey Fagan, Law, Social Science, and Racial Profiling, supra note 25, at 
106–08. 
 54. See, e.g., id. at 111–12. 
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(though not wider)55 pool of information may well increase the odds 
of an in-person contact, raising additional questions about disparities 
and the potential for a constitutional claim. 
Surveillance is fundamental to the street stop component of the 
“new policing.”  The sequence of interactions leading to an 
investigative stop, or a contact stop, often include a period of 
observation of a suspect before an officer decides if there is sufficient 
suspicion under the Fourth Amendment to proceed to contact and 
interaction with the suspect.56  In most places, these predicate 
observations are not recorded if the surveillance does not convert to a 
contact stop; only those observations that trigger actions are included 
in databases.57  This is what sets the Boston FIO regime apart from 
other forms of the new policing: its expansion under Fourth 
Amendment ground rules to include surveillance of the type that 
normally is reserved for national security concerns or complex 
criminal organizations.58  Here, the everyday movements of persons 
fall under the police gaze and are memorialized in databases.  
Whether these observations are contributory to disparate treatment 
under the Equal Protection clause on their own or in conjunction with 
direct contacts is the focus of this Article. 
D.  This Article 
Empirical tests for Equal Protection violations in policing have 
become more common and urgent as political and legal challenges to 
the “new policing” have grown.59  Research to date on vehicle and 
                                                                                                                                         
 55. The pool is deeper in the sense that more information is gathered about the 
same person or persons over time.  But if an area or group is targeted, the 
information is narrowly focused on one person or one social network or one or more 
groups of persons moving through a targeted space.  While Illinois v. Wardlow 
requires presence in a high crime area as a component of suspicion, passive stops 
based on presence in a high crime area de-temporize that presence and disconnect it 
from other indicia of suspicion that are present at the time of the street stop. See 
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). 
 56. See Fagan & Geller, Following the Script, supra note 47, at 63. 
 57. See, e.g., N.Y. Police Dep’t, The Spot, Frisk, and Question Database (2003–
2015), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/analysis_and_planning/stop_question_
and_frisk_report.shtml [https://perma.cc/9A8T-FNS6].  The databases include only 
in-person stops or field interrogations.  For each stop, the period of observation 
preceding the stop is also recorded.  Nearly all of the observation periods are less 
than two minutes. Fagan & Geller, Following the Script, supra note 47, at 63. 
 58. See Bos. Police Dep’t, Rules and Procedures, Rule 323, § 1; see, e.g., Daniel 
Richman, The Right Fight, BOS. REV. (Dec. 1, 2004), https://bostonreview.net/forum/
right-fight [https://perma.cc/7MDP-NL7B]. 
 59. Sonja B. Starr, Explaining Race Gaps in Policing: Normative and Empirical 
Challenges 3 (U Mich. L. & Econ., Res. Paper No. 15-003, 2015). 
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highway stops raises difficult questions as to the construction and 
vetting of claims of racial discrimination. 60 These difficulties have 
been compounded and perhaps have become more complex with the 
increased attention to policing inequalities by the U.S. Department of 
Justice61 and civil litigation on a variety of statutory and constitutional 
grounds.62 These cases have generated new databases and competing 
analytic strategies to identify the causal role of race in the observed 
disparities in policing.  In this Article, we examine the role of race in 
explaining how pre-arrest coercive policing and passive surveillance-
based policing are carried out in an urban setting of complex and 
varied crime problems. 
The addition of passive or surveillance-based policing models 
expands the underlying normative tensions in policing by placing 
citizens under the police gaze in a setting more closely approximating 
a panopticonistic vision of policing.63  Police surveillance of organized 
crime groups and political dissidents has a long history, with court 
interventions that established procedural and substantive boundaries 
on these activities.64  Incorporating surveillance into a prophylactic 
Terry regime, whether for street gangs or other loosely organized 
offender networks or for everyday criminal or delinquent activity, 
merges acute public safety and national security concerns into 
everyday policing.65  This spillover from national security to the “new 
policing,” raises important questions about how the equal protection 
doctrine applies.  The further dimension of racial disparity that seems 
                                                                                                                                         
 60. Id. at 34–36. 
 61. See Rachel Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing 
Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, (2009) (discussing the limitations of “retail” litigation 
under §1983 and other individual cases to produce institutional reform in policing 
and arguing for the stronger, institutionally-focused mechanisms of 42 U.S.C. § 14141 
to produce meaningful institutional changes). 
 62. See Joanna Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014) 
(showing results of litigation under Monell liability claims for police misconduct). 
 63. See William Simon, In Defense of the Panopticon (Colum. Pub. L., Res. Paper 
No. 14-412, 2014) (arguing for the social welfare and regulatory benefits of neutral 
broad surveillance including the police as governmental actors); see also Peter K. 
Manning, A View of Surveillance, in TECHNOCRIME: TECHNOLOGY, CRIME AND 
SOCIAL CONTROL, 209–42 (2008).  See generally Larry Catá Backer, Global 
Panopticism: States, Corporations, and the Governance Effects of Monitoring 
Regimes, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 101, 112 (2008) (tracing the modern 
decentralized and globalized surveillance state). 
 64. See Benjamin S. Mishkin, Filling the Oversight Gap: The Case for Local 
Intelligence Oversight, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1414, 1427 n.78 (2013). 
 65. See id.; see also, Richman, supra note 58. 
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inherent in street stop regimes, deepens the stakes in this analysis of 
the “new policing” by linking race and national security rationales.66 
The Article unfolds in the following five parts.  Part I provides 
background on the transformation of police and the emergence of 
proactive policing since Terry.  Despite the efforts of the Terry court 
to scrub race from its analysis of the original Terry stop, the role of 
race in the jurisprudence of Terry stops has become clearer over time, 
leading to the important cases today that closely connect Terry, race 
and proactive policing.  We trace the political and normative conflicts 
over racial profiling into the courts, and also into the sociological 
analysis of race and policing.  We draw a distinction between 
discrimination and bias, and show the divide in empirical strategies to 
test the two explanations of observed racial disparities. 
Part II describes in detail the research site, and the integration of 
surveillance into the regime of proactive policing in Boston.  Part III 
discusses the research strategy to identify the role of race in 
producing the patterns of policing that we observe in Boston.  We 
weigh alternatives facing empirical researchers in measurement and 
analysis of these data and explain the methodological choices that we 
made.  We distinguish the role of race in surveillance versus in-person 
encounters.  We discuss the use of officer race as a metric to identify 
the extent of racial preferences among officers.  We also discuss 
modeling choices for data where policing is spatially disaggregated 
across parts of the city that vary extensively in their social and crime 
condition. 
Part IV presents the empirical results.  We show that contact stops 
and non-contact observations of Black suspects are more common 
than for White suspects after controlling for local crime and social 
conditions in Boston neighborhoods.  The patterns are robust to 
several alternate empirical specifications.  The local emphasis on 
surveillance and interdiction of gang members explains some but not 
all of the racial disparities in the conduct of FIOs; these disparities are 
present across most tactical units and locales in the BPD.  Diversity in 
policing matters in these estimates:  Black officers appear to be less 
active in FIO reporting than their White colleagues, both in general 
patrol activities as well as in the specialized gang enforcement units.  
They make fewer stops of Black suspects and search Black suspects 
less often.  The results suggest that Black and Hispanic officers seem 
to act with statistical discrimination whereas White officers seem to 
                                                                                                                                         
 66. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler & Aziz Z. Huq, American 
Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice 
Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 356 (2013) 
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act based on preferences for discrimination that are present beyond 
what statistical discrimination would suggest.  We show continuity in 
racial disparities in police contacts from the general Terry regime of 
street stops to the expanded surveillance activities, indicative of the 
broader expansion of Terry doctrine over the past half century. 
We conclude with a discussion of two intersecting implications of 
this case study: efficiency and fairness.  As a preliminary question, we 
assess the adequacy and probative value of this empirical strategy to 
detect equal protection violations in the conduct of stops coupled 
with a more arms-length program of surveillance.  The new policing 
inevitably will produce racially disparate impacts, given crime 
patterns and the actuarialism that is baked into its strategy and logic.  
Its expansion to surveillance, which sidesteps Terry’s rules, raises new 
questions about the constitutional regulation of the “new policing.”  
The devolution of Terry to a program of both surveillance and 
administrative stops raises important questions for the regulation of 
this activity and more broadly for the governance of police with 
respect both to privacy considerations and for its racial dimensions.67 
I.  TERRY STOPS, RACE, AND THE NEW POLICING 
A.  Expansion and Deregulation of Investigative Stops 
In Terry v Ohio,68 the Supreme Court granted police broad 
authority to conduct investigative stops when they have reasonable 
and particularized suspicion to believe that crime is imminent, in 
progress, or has just occurred.69  The issues of race that were minor 
features of  the original Terry case became explicit concerns over the 
next several decades in the law, politics, and policy of policing.70 
                                                                                                                                         
 67. William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1272–73 (1999). 
 68. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 69. Id. at 30 (holding that officers could temporarily detain and question a suspect 
when they had reasonable and particularized suspicion to believe that crime was 
“afoot”). 
 70. See generally R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing and the 
War on Drugs, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571 (2003); Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, 
Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1431 (2002); see also Kevin R. 
Johnson, Racial Profiling After September 11: The Department of Justice’s 2003 
Guidelines, 25 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 85 (2004); Bernard Harcourt, Against 
Prediction: Sentencing, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age, (Univ. Chi. Pub. 
L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 94, 2005).  See generally Andrew Taslitz, 
Racial Blindsight: The Absurdity of Color-Blind Criminal Justice, 5 OHIO ST. CRIM. 
L. 1 (2007). 
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The Violent Crime Control Act of 1994 anticipated the racial 
disproportionalities in the new policing.71  Congress included a 
provision that allowed the U.S. Department of Justice to sue local law 
enforcement agencies when it observes a pattern or practice of 
systemic violations of people’s rights.72  Litigation under “Section 
14141” beginning in the 1990s identified both Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment violations in racial profiling, leading to court supervision 
of both state and local police agencies.73  Consent decrees were 
approved by federal district courts in three jurisdictions in the 1990s,74 
imposing obligations on local police departments to reform policy and 
practice to remedy constitutional violations including race 
discrimination in both stops and the use of force.75 
The first consent decrees focused on police use of force in 
Pittsburgh and Stubenville, Ohio.76  The first consent decree alleging 
racial profiling in a state police agency was formalized in late 1999 in 
New Jersey, citing constitutional violations in the selection of 
motorists for stops and searches on the New Jersey Turnpike.77  
Consent decrees in Maryland, New Jersey, and Los Angeles soon 
followed, each adding to a foundation of empirical evidence of 
racially selective police enforcement.78  A 1999 investigation by the 
                                                                                                                                         
71.Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103–322, 108 
Stat 1796 (1994). 
 72. Id. at § 210401.  Section 210401, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 14141, provides, in 
part, that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof, 
or any person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pattern or 
practice of conduct by law enforcement officers . . . that deprives persons of rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.” 42 U.S.C. § 14141. 
 73. See Rachel Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing 
Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 10, 12–13 (2009). 
 74. See Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An 
Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 817, 817, 818 n.4 (1999). 
 75. See Conduct of Law Enforcement Agencies, DEP’T OF JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/conduct-law-enforcement-agencies 
[https://perma.cc/2V5U-25EH]. 
 76. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 142–43 (1998) (discussing the first 
wave of consent decrees). 
 77. See generally United States v. New Jersey, No. 99-5970 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 1999), 
http://www.nj.gov/lps/jointapp.htm [https://perma.cc/5LYC-S2KV]. 
 78. See Mary D. Fan, Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform, Bargaining and 
Police Regulation by Data Driven Surveillance, 87 WASH. L. REV. 93, 94, 95 n.6 
(2012); see also CHARLES EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER 52 (2014). See generally IAN 
AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF S. CAL., A STUDY OF 
RACIALLY DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 
(2008); Banks, supra note 70; Fagan & Davies, supra note 24; Joanna Schwartz, 
Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role Of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement 
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New York State Attorney General cited both Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment violations by the New York City Police Department in 
its conduct of Terry stops under its “stop and frisk” regime and a 
Stipulated Settlement in New York City.79  In 2001, the Los Angeles 
Police Department finalized a consent decree80 to remedy a pattern of 
“false arrests, using excessive force, conducting stops without 
reasonable suspicion, and . . . improper searches and seizures.”81  
Between 2002 and 2014, consent decrees were implemented in fifteen 
cities across the country, revealing a set of systemic concerns about 
both the Fourth Amendment core of Terry and the more hidden 
Fourteenth Amendment prong.82 
Controversies over the racial prong of Terry’s “reasonable 
suspicion” standard arose shortly after Terry in a case where the 
Supreme Court justified the use of Mexican or Latino ethnicity to 
sanction police stop authority near the U.S.-Mexico border.83  That 
case, in conjunction with United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,84 a case 
decided a year earlier, are the only U.S. Supreme Court cases to 
specifically sanction the use of race or ethnicity in the decision to stop 
an individual under the Fourth Amendment rules stated in Terry.85  A 
similar logic of profiling based on race and ethnicity was internalized 
in the early 1980s in drug enforcement training that led to racial 
disproportionality in highway stops.86 
                                                                                                                                         
Decisionmaking, 57 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1023 (2010); Harcourt, supra note 70; Harris, 
supra note 31. 
 79. Eliot Spitzer, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP & FRISK” 
PRACTICES: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FROM THE 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 148–49, 160–62 (1999); Andrew Gelman, 
Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s 
“Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 107 J. AM. STAT. 
ASS’N 813, 813 (2007).  Those violations persisted through the Daniels stipulated 
settlement and up to Floyd verdict and order in 2013. See Floyd v. City of New York, 
959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 80. United States v. Los Angeles, No. 00-11769 GAF (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2001), 
http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/final_consent_decree.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D5YD-7CJ8]. 
 81. Letter from Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant, Att’y Gen., to James K. Hahn, 
City Attorney, City of Los Angeles (May 8, 2000) (notice of investigation letter to the 
Los Angeles Police Department), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/
lapdnoti.php [https://perma.cc/N4EB-VE9K]. 
 82. Conduct of Law Enforcement Agencies, supra note 75. 
 83. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
 84. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
 85. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 563; Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885–86. 
 86. See Harris, supra note 31, at 278–79; see also Gross & Livingston, supra note 
70, at 1431. 
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In 1996, the Supreme Court sanctioned pretextual rationales 
motivating automobile stops in Whren v. United States.87  While not 
explicitly a rationale for the use of race in selective enforcement, the 
Court refused to consider any factors other than objective 
considerations that animated the officer’s actions.88  In other words, 
having satisfied probable cause requirements under the Fourth 
Amendment, a search motivated by race would not pose a 
constitutional violation.89  Whren effectively separated Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection considerations from Fourth 
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches,90 a 
separation that was repaired in Floyd v. City of New York in 2013.91 
While maintaining its ban on the explicit use of race as an objective 
factor to justify stops, the Supreme Court expanded its analysis of 
race and policing in Illinois v. Wardlow to permit police stops based 
in part on robust correlates of race. 92  The Court noted that, although 
an individual’s presence in a “high crime area” does not meet the 
standard for a particularized suspicion of criminal activity, a location’s 
characteristics are relevant to determining whether a behavior is 
sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.93  But the 
Wardlow court offered little guidance to police and courts to define a 
                                                                                                                                         
 87. 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 
(1978) (“[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is 
hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s 
action does not invalidate that action . . . . ”)). 
 88. Id.  In the same paragraph, the Whren Court says that previous holdings show 
that the only time when an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable 
behavior, including searches, is in the context of an inventory or administrative 
search. 
 89. Kevin R. Johnson, The Story of Whren v. United States: The Song Remains 
the Same, in RACE AND LAW STORIES 419, 435 (Devon Carbado & Rachel F. Moran 
eds., 2006). 
 90. See id; see also Bernard E. Harcourt, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte: The Road to Racial Profiling, in CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE STORIES 315 (C. Steiker ed., 2006). 
 91. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding 
that “McDonald was stopped, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, because he was a black man crossing the street late at night in 
Queens”). 
 92. See Illinois v Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“An individual’s presence in 
an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a 
reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime.  But 
officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in 
determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further 
investigation.”). 
 93. Id. (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147–48 (1972)) 
(“Accordingly, we have previously noted the fact that the stop occurred in a ‘high 
crime area’ among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.”). 
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“high crime area,” in terms of its boundaries, crime levels, duration of 
crime, type of crime, or whether the standard varies across cities or 
parts of the country.94  In effect, the standard was subjective and in 
turn, beyond regulation.95  The Wardlow court left it up to the 
judgment not just of police officials but also of the individual officer 
to determine whether the location where she encountered a person 
whose behavior attracts her gaze meets the definition of “high crime 
area.”96  While celebrating local knowledge, much the same as the 
Terry court celebrated Officer McFadden’s local knowledge and 
experience, the Court also complicated the design of standards that 
could be applied to audit and regulate its application.97  In other 
words, Wardlow created a vague and subjective standard that would 
be difficult to regulate either institutionally or by courts.  Since “high 
crime areas” and social disadvantage often are conflated both 
perceptually and statistically with concentrations of minority 
citizens,98 this logic places minority neighborhoods at risk for 
elevating the suspiciousness of their residents in the eyes of the 
police. 
                                                                                                                                         
 94. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson et al., The “High-Crime Area” Question: 
Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable 
Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1605 (2008). 
 95. See id. at 1593, 1642. 
 96. See Wardlow, 528 U.S at 124 (holding that “officers are not required to ignore 
the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances 
are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.  Accordingly, we have 
previously noted the fact that the stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’ among the 
relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.”). 
 97. See id. at 124 (“In this case, moreover, it was not merely respondent’s 
presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the officers’ suspicion, 
but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police.  Our cases have also recognized 
that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable 
suspicion.”); see also Ferguson et al., supra note 94, at 1594 (“After the Supreme 
Court’s decision . . . , the totality-of-the-circumstances test has devolved into a test 
that is met with two factors: high-crime area and unprovoked flight from police.”). 
 98. See generally GLENN LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL EQUALITY (2002); 
DOUGLAS MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN STRATIFICATION 
SYSTEM (2007); DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); Robert J. Sampson & 
Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New 
Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. SOC. 603, 609–20, 622–30 
(1999); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: 
Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67 SOC. 
PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 320–21 (2004); Anthony Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: 
Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 987–88 (1999); Jeffrey 
Fagan, Crime and Neighborhood Change, in UNDERSTANDING CRIME TRENDS 81 (A. 
Goldberger & R. Rosenfeld eds., 2008); Geoffrey Alpert et al., Police Suspicion and 
Discretionary Decision Making During Citizen Stops, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 407, 411–13 
(2005). 
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B. Normative Tensions 
The basis for targeted enforcement was an instrumental analysis of 
profiling as a tradeoff of harms that leads to a moral imperative to 
create wide space for police to act on race-based signals of 
suspicion.99  Proponents of race-based selection of suspects, or 
racially disproportionate selection, based their preferences on three 
prongs: (a) higher crime rates among African American and Latino 
people (or in places where they are demographically concentrated), 
(b) the greater efficiency and effectiveness of police methods that 
apply race-based strategies, and (c) the moral imperative to pursue 
tactics that maximize social welfare and security.100  To ignore race in 
the design of police tactics would be to risk greater exposure of 
individuals, including those in the affected groups, to unjustified 
harms.101  These utilitarian arguments for profiling assume that the 
social good produced by welfare outweighs the harms of the 
inequalities inherent in race-based selection of persons.102 
The arguments advancing profiling ran headlong into its 
constitutional weaknesses, even under a newly capacious Fourth 
Amendment suspicion standard that invited the substitution of race-
based correlates of suspicion for explicit racial categories.103  The 
                                                                                                                                         
 99. See Mathias Risse & Richard Zeckhauser, Racial Profiling, 32 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 131, 131–35 (2004). 
 100. See id. at 135, 141–42, 151 (2004). But see Annabelle Lever, Why Racial 
Profiling is Hard to Justify: A Response to Risse and Zeckhauser, 33 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 94, 109 (2005) (“[R]acial profiling will likely exacerbate the racism of a racist 
society and, at all events, will place particularly onerous burdens on those who are 
already burdened by racism.  In short, the dangers of compounding injustices that 
are, already, grave and persistent, means that more is required by way of evidence 
and argument to justify racial profiling than to oppose it); Steven N. Durlauf, Racial 
Profiling as a Public Policy Question: Efficiency, Equity, and Ambiguity, 92 AM. 
ECON. REV. 132, 135(2005) (“First, . . . the current evidence on profiling and guilt 
rates does not represent the basis for a justification of current racial profiling 
practices.  The effects of profiling on the crime rate are ambiguous, whereas there is a 
clear fairness violation involved.  Second, there should exist a presumption against 
profiling policies which places the burden of proof on advocates of profiling to 
demonstrate that the efficiency effects are sufficient to overcome the fairness 
violation.”). 
 101. Risse & Zeckhauser, supra note 99, at 135. 
 102. A similar argument was made by Sunstein and Vermeule on capital 
punishment.  They argued that if the death penalty was an effective deterrent to 
murder, then the life-life tradeoff of capital punishment created a more imperative to 
execute those convicted of capital murder, and a moral offense when executions are 
not carried out in the face of evidence of deterrence and the possibility of lives lost.  
See generally Cass Sunstein & Adrien Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally 
Required?  Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 (2005). 
 103. See Whren and Wardlow discussions, supra Part I.A. 
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inherent constitutional violations deflated the moral arguments, as 
did the dubious claim of its effectiveness.  But other critiques 
emerged that also pushed back on profiling.104  Beyond the failure of 
proponents to find empirical support for the claim of its benefits, the 
utilitarian view tended to discount the serious harms to the innocent 
who are stopped, particularly innocent African Americans who bore 
the brunt of police actions.105 
Recognition of those harms was inherent in the Terry decision 
itself, which acknowledged that police stops, especially for the 
innocent, amounted to more than a “petty indignity.”106  The harms 
of Terry stops are several: the stigma harm of being singled out when 
innocent, the shaming of being singled out by the police and 
physically interrogated in front of one’s family and neighbors, the 
racial stigma that attaches when minorities are disproportionately 
targeted for stops, and the potential for physical violence when stops 
arouse anger or when police use aggressiveness when confronted by 
their own safety fears.107  Stops can be verbally harsh, physically 
aggressive, or laced with racial or sexual invectives that trigger a 
variety of emotional reactions.108  Accordingly, a robust and 
consistent stream of research reveals numerous harms that people of 
color experience as a result of accumulated, proactive police contacts.  
Survey research in New York City under its stop and frisk program 
showed elevated rates of symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder 
among the young adults most often stopped and most intrusively 
policed.109 
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At the same time, a different form of equal protection complaints 
remained generally unheard and has only recently been taken 
seriously.  Minority citizen concerns about the everyday under-
policing of distressed neighborhoods also have received less scholarly 
attention.110  Nonetheless, police executives have increasingly come to 
understand that disadvantaged, high-crime minority communities may 
indeed simultaneously experience under- and over-policing.111  
Professor Randall Kennedy notes that “in terms of misery inflicted by 
direct criminal violence, blacks (and other people of color) suffer 
more from the criminal acts of their racial ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’ than 
they do from the racist misconduct of White police officers.”112  Given 
that both under- and over-policing have been shown to seriously 
undermine public confidence in and trust of the police, policy makers 
face a weighty challenge concerning how best to deliver effective 
crime control strategies without engaging in potentially racially 
discriminatory policing practices.113 
C.  Is It Bias? Approaches to Studying Police Stops and Searches 
Recent empirical evidence on police stops supports perceptions 
among minority citizens that police disproportionately stop African 
American and Hispanic motorists, and that once stopped, these 
citizens are more likely to be searched or arrested.114  For example, 
surveys with nationwide probability samples, completed in 1999, 2002, 
and 2008 showed that African-Americans were far more likely than 
other Americans to report being stopped on the highways by 
police.115  Each survey showed that minority drivers also were more 
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likely to report being arrested, handcuffed, or searched by police, and 
that they more often were threatened with force or had force used 
against them. 
Traffic violations also serve as the rationale or pretext for stops of 
motorists,116 just as “suspicious behavior” is the spark for both 
pedestrian and traffic stops.117  As with traffic violations, the range of 
suspicious behaviors is broad enough to challenge efforts to identify 
an appropriate baseline to which to compare race-specific stop 
rates.118  Pedestrian stops are at the very core of policing, used to 
enforce narcotics and weapons laws, to identify fugitives or other 
persons for whom warrants may be outstanding, to investigate 
reported crimes and “suspicious” behavior, and to improve 
community quality of life.119  Indeed, because low-level “quality of 
life” and misdemeanor offenses are more likely to be committed in 
the open, the “reasonable suspicion” standard is more easily satisfied 
in these sorts of crimes.120 
Two distinct approaches characterize recent efforts to model and 
understand racial disparities in police stops.121  Each focuses less on 
identifying racial bias than on understanding the role of race in 
explaining patterns of police behavior.122  Attributing bias is difficult: 
causal claims about discrimination would require far more 
information than the typical administrative (observational) datasets 
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can supply.  For example, when Officer McFadden stopped suspect 
John Terry, he used his law enforcement “experience” to interpret 
Terry’s behavior in front of the jewelry store.123  The multiplicity of 
interacting factors complicated the identification of the role of race in 
the decision to detain Terry,124 but several analyses of the facts and 
jurisprudence of Terry suggest that the Supreme Court opinion 
discounted the influence of race in the opinion.125 
In Terry, it would be difficult to identify race alone, apart from the 
context in which race was observed, as the factor that animated 
McFadden’s decision to stop and frisk suspect Terry.126  Instead, 
reliable evidence of ethnic or racial bias in these instances would 
require experimental designs that control for these competing and 
interacting factors—situational context, demeanor of suspect—so as 
to isolate differences in outcomes that could only be attributed to race 
or ethnicity.  Such experiments are routinely used in tests of 
discrimination in housing and employment.127  But observational 
studies that lack such controls are often embarrassed by omitted 
variable biases: few studies can control for all the variables that police 
consider in deciding whether to stop or search someone, much less 
their several combinations or permutations.  Research in situ that 
relies on direct observation of police behavior requires officers to 
articulate the reasons for their actions, a task that is vulnerable to 
numerous validity threats.128  Sampling considerations, as well as the 
presence of researchers in the context of the decision, also challenge 
the validity of observational studies. 
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The first approach to studying racial disparities bypasses the 
question of whether police intend to discriminate on the basis of 
ethnicity or race, and instead focuses on disparate impacts of police 
stop strategies.  This strategy is prevalent in studies of decisions in the 
context of highways stops.129  In this approach, comparisons of “hit 
rates,” or efficiencies in the proportion of stops that yield positive 
results, serve as evidence of disparate impacts of police stops.130  This 
type of analysis has been used in several studies, including studies of 
police behaviors on highways.131. This approach bypasses the supply-
side question of who is stopped (and for what reason), and instead 
looks only at disparate impacts or outcomes for different groups. 
Outcome tests are usually agnostic with respect to race-based 
motivations for stops or frisks versus a search for efficiency and 
deterrence.132  They can show when a particular policy or decision-
making outcome has a disparate impact whose racial 
disproportionality is not justified by heightened institutional 
productivity, negating an efficiency rationale.  In the context of 
profiling, outcome tests assume that the ex post probability that a 
police search will uncover drugs or other contraband is a function of 
the degree of probable cause that police use in deciding to stop and 
search a suspect.133  If searches of minorities are less productive than 
searches of Whites, this could be evidence that police have a lower 
threshold of probable cause when searching minorities.  At the very 
least, it is a sign of differential treatment of minorities that in turn 
produces a disparate impact. 
Knowles, Persico, and Todd consider this “hit rate” 
approach theoretically as well as empirically in a study finding that, of 
the drivers on Interstate 95 in Maryland stopped by police on 
suspicion of drug trafficking, African Americans were as likely as 
Whites to have drugs in their cars.134  Their theoretical analysis posits 
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a dynamic process that considers the behaviors of police and citizens 
of different races, and integrates their decisions in equilibrium where 
police calibrate their behavior to the probabilities of detecting illegal 
behavior, and citizens in different racial groups adjust their 
propensities to accommodate the likelihood of detection.135  They 
concluded that the search for drugs was an efficient allocation of 
police resources, despite the disparate impacts of these stops on 
minority citizens.136 
Outcome tests can be constructed as quasi-experiments, with race 
as a treatment, to identify the role of race in the selection of citizens 
for searches.  Ridgeway matched suspects within officers to compare 
the post-stop outcomes of White suspects to those of minority 
suspects in similar locations, stopped at similar times and for the same 
reasons.137  He reports no differences in post-stop arrests (“hit rates”) 
despite the greater number of stops of non-Whites.138  But this 
approach seeks to explain away contextual variables, especially 
neighborhood context, rather than explicitly incorporate these factors 
in an identification strategy.  Close and Mason construct a disparate 
outcome quasi-experiment to identify the role of race in police 
searches by comparing the preferences of officers of different races to 
search motorists, controlling for the motorist’s race.139  They use both 
an outcomes-based non-parametric (quasi-experimental) analysis and 
a standard benchmarking parametric (regression) approach, and 
report both personal biases and police cultural bias in their propensity 
to search African American and Latino drivers.140 
These are useful but limited strategies.  The robustness of these 
designs is compromised, by the omission of several factors—some 
unobservable and others usually absent from administrative data—
that might bias their claims, such as racial differences in the attributes 
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that police consider when deciding which motorists or pedestrians to 
stop, search or arrest,141 or differences in police behavior in 
neighborhoods or other social contexts with different racial 
makeup.142  The omission of neighborhood context also biases 
estimates of the proportionality of police stops of citizens.  The 
randomizing equilibrium assumptions in the Knowles et al. 
approach—that both police and potential offenders adjust their 
behavior in response to the joint probabilities of carrying contraband 
and being stopped—tend to average across broad heterogeneous 
conditions both in police decision making and offenders’ propensities 
to crime,143 and discount the effects of race-specific sensitivities 
toward crime decisions under varying conditions of detection risk via 
police stop.144  When these two concerns are addressed, Dharmapala 
and Ross identify different types of equilibria that lead to different 
conclusions about racial prejudice in police stops and searches.145 
Accordingly, the nature and extent of racial bias in the policing of 
motorists and pedestrians remains unsettled empirically.146  Supply-
side issues, both in the number and characteristics of the persons 
available for stops by virtue of law violation or even suspicious 
behavior, complicate the search game paradigm by skewing the 
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population of stopped drivers according to the ex ante probabilities of 
criminality that police officers assign to different racial groups.  
Institutional or individual differences in the goals of law enforcement 
may also create heterogeneity both in the selection of individuals to 
be stopped and the decisions to engage them in searches for drugs, 
weapons, or other contraband.  Officers may pursue one set of law 
enforcement goals for one group—maximizing arrests—while 
pursuing a different set of goals—minimizing crime—for another.  
Racial nepotism or antagonism may lead to differences in police stop 
and search behaviors when officers of one race face choices as to stop 
or search a driver of the same or a different racial or ethnic group.147 
These complexities illustrate the difficulty of identifying the role of 
race in producing racial disparities in stops and searches, and suggest 
a second approach that incorporates the contexts in which individual 
officers consider race in their everyday interactions with citizens.  
Gelman et al. and Alpert et al. show how neighborhood context 
influences both the attribution of suspicion that animates an 
encounter and the outcomes of police-citizen encounters.148  The 
institutional context of policing also may influence individual officers’ 
decisions through stigmatizing neighborhoods as “high crime” or 
disorderly, skewing how officers perceive and interpret the actions of 
citizens.  Institutional cultures also may implicitly tolerate such 
perceptual or cognitive schema and internalize them into policy 
preferences and strategic decisions, as well as internal preferences for 
reward, promotion, or discipline. 
One advantage of this approach is that it can accommodate 
transparency, as the analyses in this Article show.  When police scan 
for suspicious behavior, we have only vague ideas about how their 
discretion is managed, and even more vague ideas about what exactly 
it is that they are looking for.149   While there may be nothing like an 
algorithm to explain how observations are formed, there at least are 
observable patterns.  The worry in this regime is about race: 
unconscious patterns that shape the formation of suspicion based on 
archetypes such as the “symbolic assailant” and other processes that 
shape cognition and interpretation of behavioral cues.  Transparency 
at least provides a window to observe what those processes produce. 
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In other words, it lets observers, assuming access to these records, 
observe the observers as they conduct surveillance. 150 
What remains unknown in this process is the harms that may 
accrue from these routine invasions of privacy.151  The dignitarian 
concerns pose one type of harm: the fact that one is a target of 
surveillance signals to other observers and perhaps to the watching 
public the person is a potential threat.  That alone can have 
stigmatizing consequences throughout the community of the 
observed.152  Apart from the dignity worries, conducting these 
observations and stops can have negative effects on the way that 
police regard citizens and respect their autonomy and privacy.153 
II.  DATA AND METHODS 
A.  The Research Site 
Boston, Massachusetts, is the site for this research.  The FIO 
strategy in Boston encompasses street encounters of the sort 
envisioned in Terry, where officers temporarily detain and question 
persons for whom they have reasonable and articulable suspicion that 
“crime is afoot.”154  This regime also includes non-contact 
observations, which we discussed earlier. 
In this study, we analyzed data provided by the BPD on its FIO 
activity.  The BPD Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC) 
maintains an electronic database of FIO reports.155  These forms are 
used to document BPD officer interactions with individuals suspected 
of criminal activity, or associates of those individuals, including direct 
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encounters and non-contact observations.156  FIO reports are a 
central activity in the BPD’s intelligence efforts to collect and analyze 
data on the activities and whereabouts of known and suspected 
criminals and their associates in Boston.157  The reports document the 
name, date-of-birth, sex, and race of FIO subjects as well as the date, 
time, and location of interaction.158 
Our analysis focuses on the period from 2007 through 2010.  
During that time, BPD officers made N=204,739 FIO reports.159  
Compared to the residential population, the targets of FIO reports 
were disproportionately male, young, and Black.160  For these 204,739 
FIO reports, the subjects were 89.0% male, 54.7% ages 24 or younger, 
and 63.3% Black.161  According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2010, 
Boston had some 617,594 residents that were 47.9% male, 36.2% ages 
24 or younger, and 25.1% Black.162 
At first glance, these differences are suggestive of racially disparate 
treatment in BPD FIO activity.  However, these differences could 
also reflect crime risk differences in Boston’s neighborhoods and 
population groups.  Criminological research has long documented 
that criminal offenders are more likely to be young and male.163  
Violent crime problems also tend to concentrate in highly 
disadvantaged urban neighborhoods that are disproportionately 
populated by Black residents.164 
BPD officers are required to document the reason for the 
completion of each FIO report and required to note whether they 
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conducted Terry frisks for officer safety purposes and/or searches for 
the purposes of seizing evidence.165  Some 40.5% of the FIO reports 
involve a frisk and/or search of the subject (82,919).166  Officers have 
very limited space on the form to record their reasons for the FIO 
and, unfortunately, 75.0% (153,554) of the FIO reports simply state 
“investigation person” as the justification.167  This lack of 
documentation of stop rationales prevents a Fourth Amendment 
analysis of the legal justifications for discretionary stops and searches 
of FIO subjects.  Also, there is no information on the outcomes of the 
FIO events about whether the frisks and searches led to arrests, 
summons, or seizure of weapons or contraband.  In fact, FIO events 
that did lead to either of those outcomes are not recorded.  Officers 
default to the completion of an arrest report in those circumstances.  
In turn, the type of outcome analysis that was essential to resolving 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims in the Floyd stop-and-
frisk litigation in New York could not be completed here. 
B.  Empirical Strategy 
Our empirical strategy combines two distinct approaches to 
estimate racial disparities.  The first strategy is a disparate treatment 
strategy that examines stops in alternate empirical specifications 
looking first at aggregates—neighborhoods or police districts—and 
then individuals nested within those districts.  We drew upon 
regression models developed by Fagan and colleagues168 to 
investigate alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution by the New York City Police Department 
(“NYPD”) in their stop, question, and frisk (“SQF”) practices as part 
of the David Floyd et al. v. City of New York et al. U.S. District 
                                                                                                                                         
 165. Krivo, Peterson & Kuhl, supra note 164.  
 166. 38.6% of the FIO reports indicated that the subjects were frisked and 11.6% of 
the FIO reports indicated that the subjects were searched.  All but 1.8% of the 
searches were reported in conjunction with a frisk of the subject.  Moreover, 
descriptive statistical analyses revealed that the biggest differences between FIO type 
and subject race arose when the FIO involved a frisk and/or search relative to a more 
simple observation and/or interrogation.  Some 29.5% of White subjects were frisked 
/ searched during an FIO relative to the 45.4% of Black subjects, 40.5% of Hispanic 
subjects, and 35.6% of Asian or other race subjects.  As such, FIO type was collapsed 
into two categories: 0 =  No Search (Observed and/or Interrogated only) and 1 = 
Frisk and/or Search Conducted. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. (2010) in David Floyd et al. v. City of New 
York et al., U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 08 Civ. 01034 
(SAS), October 28; Gelman, Fagan & Kiss supra note 79. 
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Court complaint.169  Their analyses examined whether the racial 
composition of NYPD precinct residents predicted stop patterns after 
controlling for the influences of crime, social conditions, and the 
allocation of police resources.170  Here, we adapted their analytical 
framework to examine whether the racial composition of Boston 
neighborhoods predicts BPD FIO patterns, adjusting for crime, social 
and economic predictors, and police resources. 
The second strategy exploits the availability of data on officer race 
to determine whether the observed differences in stop rates for White 
and non-White youths are a function of preference-based 
discrimination, or statistical discrimination.  Statistical discrimination 
would reflect a tendency to stop one group at a higher rate than 
another based on observable characteristics such as known crime 
rates.  But preference-based discrimination would reflect a tendency 
to prefer one group for stops over others based on factors unrelated 
to their observable differences in the targeted behavior. 
A study by Professors Antonovics and Knight (AK) conducted this 
type of analysis in Boston based on traffic stops by the BPD.  AK 
extended the Knowles, Persico and Todd (KPT)171 hit rate (or 
equilibrium) test to test for bias in traffic stops by Boston police 
officers from 2001–2003.172  Following the KPT equilibrium model, 
AK assume that officers will rationally stop motorists according to 
their beliefs about the comparative propensities to violate the law by 
carrying contraband—drugs or weapons.173  If population groups 
understand the risks of violating the law, they will adjust their 
behaviors accordingly and their propensities should fall into 
equilibrium with other groups and with officers’ preferences.174  In a 
statistical model, differences in “hit rates” between groups should be 
                                                                                                                                         
 169. Second Amended Complaint, David Floyd et al. v. City of New York et al., 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 08 Civ. 01034 (SAS), 
October 28. 
 170. Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., in David Floyd et al. v. City of New York, 
supra note 168; Floyd v. City of New York, Opinion and Order, 08 Civ. 1034 (SAS) 
(S.D.N.Y.), 58–60 (2013). 
 171. Knowles, Persico & Todd, supra note 134; see also Nicola Persico & Petra 
Todd, Using Hit Rate Tests to Test for Racial Bias in Law Enforcement: Vehicle 
Searches in Wichita, 515 ECON. J. 351 (2006).  For a critique of the KPT equilibrium 
model, see David Bjerk, Racial Profiling, Statistical Discrimination, and the Effect of 
a Colorblind Policy on the Crime Rate, 9 J. OF PUB. ECON. THEORY 543 (2007). 
 172. Kate Antonovics & Brian G. Knight, A New Look at Racial Profiling: 
Evidence from the Boston Police Department, 91 REV. OF ECON. & STAT., 163–77 
(2009). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
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negligible, a sign that equilibrium has been reached.175  This form of 
statistical discrimination stands in contrast to preference based 
discrimination, where police will stop motorists based on preferences 
to detain or arrest citizens in a particular racial group independent 
from their assumptions about that group’s propensity to carry 
contraband. 
In this case, AK were able to observe the race of both the officer 
and the suspect and estimate the magnitude of preference-based 
discrimination.  AK used officer race-suspect race dyads as a 
benchmark for discrimination, assuming that officers would be more 
likely to stop and search a suspect from a different racial group.  
Perhaps officers believe they are better able to detect signals of 
wrongdoing among persons within their own race, or same-group 
membership may lead to preferential treatment.  Regardless of 
motive, evidence of higher rates of cross-race differences in search 
rates would suggest preference-based discrimination rather than 
simply statistical discrimination based on general beliefs about crime-
propensity within each racial or ethnic group.  Other studies have 
used the same strategy in different settings to reach the same 
conclusions.176 
However, the previous studies using officer-race benchmarks have 
examined bias in vehicle searches pursuant to traffic stops.  In our 
strategy, we exploit the availability of these same data to estimate 
race-based preferences among officers in street stops, preferences 
that are not easily explained by assumptions about each group’s 
propensity for crime. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 175. Knowles, Persico & Todd, supra note 134.  But see Bernard Harcourt, Against 
Profiling, supra note 116 (arguing that the assumptions of consistent responses—or 
elasticities—across different racial groups is unrealistic given their overall exposure 
to both legal earning and the potential punishment costs from detection). 
 176. Close & Mason, supra note 146; Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda B. Geller, Profiling 
and Consent (Colum. L. Sch., Working Paper, 2010), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1641326 [https://perma.cc/WL2D-ABGE]; J. Mitchell Pickerill, Clayton 
Mosher & Travis Pratt, Search And Seizure, Racial Profiling, and Traffic Stops: A 
Disparate Impact Framework, 3 L. & POL’Y 1 (2009). But see Rob Tillyer, Charles F. 
Klahm & Robin S. Engel, The Discretion to Search:  A Multilevel Examination of 
Driver Demographics and Officer Characteristics, 28 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 
184,184–205 (2012) (showing that suspect race effects are reduced after controlling 
for a set of contextual effects, but remain significant). 
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1.  Disparate Treatment by Race 
The general test for evidence of disparate treatment is a regression 
equation that takes the form:  
 
Outcome = α + β1*Minority + Σiβi*(Plausible non-Race Influences) + εi 
 
where Outcome is the event or status of interest, Minority is an 
indicator for the racial composition or status of the unit observed (i.e., 
neighborhood or person, depending on the outcome), Plausible Non-
Race Influences are a set of variables representing non-race factors 
that also might influence the outcome, and an error term  that 
captures the variation in the outcome that cannot be explained by 
either Minority status or the Non-Race Influences.  These models 
may include non-race influences that are correlated with race, so as to 
better identify the unique effects of race that are present once the 
influence of proxies for race are removed.177  The goal in specifying 
these models is to identify the effects of race on outcomes after 
simultaneously considering factors that may be relevant to race.178  
Under a disparate treatment theory, the critical question is whether 
                                                                                                                                         
 177. For a general discussion of the specification of regression models to test for 
disparate treatment, see generally D. James Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights 
Litigation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 533, 565–72 (2008) (arguing for an analytic approach 
simulating an experiment by searching for units (persons) that are similar to one 
another in all observable ways except treatment (in our case, suspect race), ignoring 
the data from units that have no counterparts or matches, and conducting separate 
regressions for the “treated” and “untreated groups).  However, balancing between 
“treated” and “untreated” groups is made more difficult and less reliable by the 
sorting processes of individuals to treatments, or by limitations in the number and 
types of covariates that explain such sorting, and the plausibility of such 
counterfactuals.  In our case, people are not randomly “allocated” to race, nor are the 
factors that explain racial sorting by age and socio-economic status, as well as by 
neighborhood or other important context such as school randomly distributed.  And, 
searching only for “matched” cases inevitably results in discarding data and loss of 
precision.  One solution is separate regressions for each “treatment” condition to 
determine what might take place for cases that were excluded due to lack of plausible 
counterfactuals, and appending this information to the basic comparisons across 
groups.  For a general discussion of how regressions specify these sorting mechanisms 
that influence predictors of an outcome, see Thomas J. Campbell, Regression 
Analysis in Title VII Cases: Minimum Standards, Comparable Worth, and Other 
Issues Where Law and Statistics Meet, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1299 (1984). 
 178. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).  In a disparate 
treatment claim, we would ask if the use of a high school diploma requirement biases 
the hiring process since African American job applicants may be less likely to have 
obtained a high school diploma.  Once this race-correlated control is introduced, it 
would likely reduce the racial disparity in the hiring rates and provide a different test 
than would a simple disparate impact test. 
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an applicant’s race was the cause of being denied employment.  
Failure to do so raises the risk of “omitted variable bias,” which could 
lead to erroneous conclusions about the effects of variables that do 
appear in a regression test.179 
2.  Measures and Model Specification 
We analyze differences in stop rates by neighborhood to determine 
whether FIO activity is explained by local crime rates, or if there is 
additional variance that is explained by race.  A race-neutral practice 
would predict a positive effect for local crime rates and non-
significant effects for race once we control for crime. 
The neighborhood analyses were conducted using 2010 U.S. 
Census tracts as the principal unit of analysis.  Census tracts were 
used instead of BPD geographic units (e.g. districts, reporting areas) 
or smaller areal units (e.g. Census block groups, street segments).  
Tracts are areas roughly equivalent to neighborhoods developed by 
the U.S. Census Bureau for the purposes of analyzing populations.180  
According to the 2010 U.S. Census, Boston was comprised of N=181 
tracts.  Data on the social and economic conditions in these tracts 
were obtained from the 2007–2010 American Community Survey 
(ACS).181 Eight tracts were excluded from the analysis because there 
were no residents in these areas for a total N=173 tracts.182  The FIO 
data included date and geographical location (x-y coordinates) 
information that permitted aggregation of FIO counts to Census 
tracts and by differing time periods.183  The main outcome variable 
was the monthly count of FIOs made in each Census tract between 
2007 and 2010 (N=8,304; 173 Census tracts with 48 observations 
each). 
                                                                                                                                         
 179. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Three Tests for Measuring Unjustified Disparate Impacts 
in Organ Transplantation: The Problem of ‘Included Variable’ Bias, 48 PERSP. 
BIOLOGY MED. 68 (2005); Ian Ayres, Testing for Discrimination and the Problem of 
‘Included Variable Bias’ (Yale L. Sch., Working Paper, 2010), https://perma.cc/G837-
UPYY.  
 180. 2010 Geographic Terms and Concepts—Census Tract, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/gtc/gtc_ct.html [https://perma.cc/2KH5-
SHWF]; Nancy Krieger, A Century of Census Tracts: Health and the Body Politic 
(1906–2006), 83(3) J. URB. HEALTH 355 (2006). 
 181. American Community Survey (ACS), U.S. Census Bureau, 
http://www.census.gov/acs/ [https://perma.cc/48SE-HGK3]. 
 182. These eight Census tracts included the Stony Brook reservation, Belle Isle 
Marsh reservation, the Harbor Islands, the Esplanade recreational area, the Franklin 
Park recreational area, and three commercial property waterfront areas. 
 183. 95.2% (194,858 of 204,739) of the FIO reports were geocoded to 2010 Census 
Tracts in Boston. 
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The specific estimation technique for this analysis, or the functional 
form of the regression equation, was responsive to the specific 
measure of FIO activity (monthly counts in Census tract units).  
Accordingly, models were estimated using negative binomial 
regressions.  This class of regression models is appropriate for counts 
of events, such as FIO reports in a specific area, where assumptions 
about the independence of events cannot be reliably made.184  These 
models also are appropriate for counts where the distribution are 
over-dispersed; that is, where the variance exceeds the sample mean. 
The model takes the form of: 
pሺݕሻ ൌ ܲሺ ௜ܻ ൌ ݕ௜ሻ ൌ Г
ሺݕ௜ ൅ ߶ሻ
ݕ௜! Γሺ߶ሻ
߶థߣ௜௬೔
ሺ߶ ൅ ߣ௜ሻథି௬೔ 
 
where Yi is the expected count of events in each unit i given 
parameters that we observe.  We estimate the incidence of events for 
overdispersed models as: 
 
Εሾݕ݅|Χ݅, ߝ݅ሿ ൌ exp〖ߙ ൅ 	߯݅ᇱߚ ൅ 	ߝ݅ሻ ൌ ݄݅ߣ݅ 
 
where hi = exp(εi) is assumed to have a one parameter gamma 
distribution, G (θ,θ) with mean 1 and variance 1 / θ  = κ . 
We used a specific form of negative binomial regression known as 
General Estimating Equations (GEEs).185  GEEs are beneficial for 
nested or hierarchically organized data, such as years within Census 
tracts, as they allow for the specification of within-subject correlations 
of observations.  These nesting variables are treated as random effects 
in the estimating models.  Random effects here include census tract 
correlations.  To adjust for difference in population densities in the 
census tracts, we estimated population-averaged models.  Since the 
analyses include a sequence of time periods (calendar months), the 
models include an AR(1) variance estimation function that adjusts for 
the serial autocorrelation (or autoregression) of the counts of events 
                                                                                                                                         
 184. Negative binomial regressions also are especially useful for discrete data such 
as event counts when the variance exceeds the mean across areas. JOSEPH M. HILBE, 
NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION (2007); see also Richard Berk & John M. 
MacDonald, Overdispersion and Poisson Regression, 24 J. QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 
269 (2008); D. Wayne Osgood, Poisson-Based Regression Analysis of Aggregate 
Crime Rates, 16 J. QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 21 (2000); David A. Freedman, Statistical 
Models: Theory and Practice (2005); WILLIAM GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
(2003). 
 185. JAMES W. HARDIN & JOSEPH M. HILBE, GENERALIZED ESTIMATING 
EQUATION (2003); Gary A. Ballinger, Using Generalized Estimating Equations for 
Longitudinal Data Analysis, 7 ORG. RES. METHODS 127 (2004). 
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within sampling units over long periods of time.186  We controlled for 
yearly and seasonal variations187 in the monthly counts of FIO reports 
by including fixed-effects for calendar quarter and year.188 
Police activity in Boston is closely linked to crime.189  As such, we 
test whether crime rates in a neighborhood are linked to the intensity 
of BPD FIO activity in that area.  We use crime incident data 
generated by the BPD on 113,419 “index” crime incidents in Boston 
between 2007 and 2010.190  These crime incident data were geocoded, 
and then aggregated by Census tract and month of occurrence to 
create a covariate measuring lagged and logged monthly counts of 
serious crime in Boston census tracts.191  As Figure 1 reveals, FIO 
reports made by BPD officers in 2010 tended to concentrate in census 
tracts with higher rates of total crime incidents and higher 
percentages of black resident populations.  Figure 1 also shows a high 
degree of spatial autocorrelation in the concentration of FIO reports 
                                                                                                                                         
 186. AR(1) adjustments reflect the reality that the best predictor of what the crime 
rate will be in the next month is what it was in last month.  This is an empirical 
constraint in identifying the relationship between crime and policing.  Failure to 
correct for this temporal dependence will bias the standard errors in estimates of 
crime effects on policing, and this distortion remains even when fixed effects are used 
to control for temporal trends. See BADI BALTAGI, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF 
PANEL DATA (2001); Badi Baltagi & Qi Li, Testing AR(1) Against MA(1) 
Disturbances in an Error Component Model, 68 J. OF ECONOMETRICS 133 (1995). 
 187. There is a long tradition of studies of the seasonality of crime and the 
theoretical explanations for why crime varies by season.  See, e.g., John R. Hipp et 
al., Crime of Opportunity or Crimes of Emotion? Testing Two Explanations of 
Seasonal Change in Crime, 82 SOC. FORCES 1333 (2004). 
 188. We created indicator variables to account for seasonal variations by calendar 
quarter.  Quarter 1 represented January, February, and March monthly FIO counts 
(1 = Yes, 0 = No).  Quarter 2 represented April, May, and June monthly FIO counts 
(1 = Yes, 0 = No).  Quarter 3 represented July, August, and September monthly FIO 
counts (1 = Yes, 0 = No).  Quarter 4 represented October, November, and December 
monthly FIO counts (1 = Yes, 0 = No).  Quarter 1 served as the reference category 
for the seasonal polychotomous dummy variable.  We also created indicator variables 
for year to account for annual variations in the data. 
 189. Anthony A. Braga et al., An Ex-Post-Facto Evaluation Framework for Place-
Based Police Interventions, 35 EVALUATION REV. 592 (2011). 
 190. Index crimes, as defined by the FBI, included murder, rape, robbery, 
aggravated assault, burglary, auto theft, and larceny. See FBI, Uniform Crime 
Reporting, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr [https://perma.cc/9JS2-5A78].  Using 
ArcGIS 10.2 mapping software, the BRIC was able to geocode 113,152 of these 
incidents to their respective Census tracts (99.8 % of 113,419 total crime incidents). 
 191. All models control for the one-month-lag of logged total crime incidents.  The 
natural log transformation of the actual number of crimes was used.  Log 
transformation is necessary to adjust when the distributions are highly skewed and 
non-linear.  The lag reflects the police planning process whereby FIO reports and 
other enforcement activity are adjusted to reflect actual crime conditions. 
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across Census tracts.192  We controlled for this spatial dependence in 
our regression models by including a Moran’s I spatial effects 
covariate.193 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 192. Spatial dependence, or autocorrelation, violates the assumption of 
independence among observations used in most statistical models.  Spatial regression 
analyses of the variation of crime, etc., across neighborhood units account for spatial 
autocorrelation through the addition of a spatial effects covariate such as Moran’s I . 
The argument is that analyses that do not compensate for spatial dependency can 
have unstable parameter estimates and yield unreliable significance tests. See 
MICHAEL D. WARD & KRISTIAN SKREDE GLEDITSCH, SPATIAL REGRESSION MODELS 
8–10 (Sage U. Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in Soc. Sci., No. 155, 2008). 
 193. ArcGIS 10.2 was used to export a shapefile containing the total number of 
FIOs made per U.S. Census Tract during the study time period to GeoDa 1.4.6 
spatial analysis software.  Using queen’s contiguity, a Moran’s I = 0.674689 was 
estimated (199 permutations, z = 14.73, p<.005; 99 permutations, z = 15.18, p<.01).  
The Moran’s I spatial autocorrelation lag for each Census Tract was exported to 
Stata 13.1 and included in the neighborhood analysis. 
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We also control for police deployment patterns.  The allocation of 
police and targeting of police activity frequently involved 
“saturation” deployment of police patrols in higher crime areas.  
Since these areas in Boston and elsewhere often had higher 
concentrations of non-White residents,194 asymmetrical deployments 
of police increased exposure of citizens to police and thus the 
increased probability of encounters with minority citizens as 
                                                                                                                                         
 194. Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J. Krivo, Segregated Spatial Locations, Race-
Ethnic Composition, and Neighborhood Violent Crime, 623(1) AM. ACADEMY OF 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 93–107 (2009). 
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compared to Whites,195 in turn producing racial or ethnic differences 
in contact patterns.  Accordingly, an analysis of FIO patterns by 
neighborhood required an understanding of the allocation of police 
patrol resources in each unit of analysis.  Patrol strength data were 
provided by the BPD for each of their eleven policing districts 
between 2007 and 2010.  These patrol data were then allocated to 
each Boston census tract.196 
It is also important to note that the regulation and oversight of FIO 
policy and activities takes place at the police district level.  There are 
12 police districts in Boston, each commanded by a police captain 
who reports directly to the Superintendent of the Bureau of Field 
Services.  BPD Captains are accountable for district-level crime 
trends and have discretion to allocate officers tactically within 
districts.  Since tracts are nested within Boston’s policing districts, we 
included fixed effects to account for any unobserved effects of 
conditions in the districts that might influence police activity, such as 
district-level variations in the use of FIOs to gather intelligence and 
maintain contact with potential offenders.197 
Several studies show that neighborhood crime rates, including 
violent crime, 198 are strongly associated with concentrated social 
                                                                                                                                         
 195. See, e.g., Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Marcinda Mason & Matthew Zingraff, 
Looking for the Driving While Black Phenomena: Conceptualizing Racial Bias 
Processes and their Associated Distributions, 7 POLICE Q. 3 (2004). 
 196. Because BPD districts do not, as a rule, share boundaries with Census tracts, 
we allocated patrol strength to tracts based on the percent of each district’s area that 
falls into each tract.  For example, if Census tract A shares area with three police 
districts (A1, A2, and A3), the Census tract patrol strength was estimated as [(% of 
A1 falling into tract A * patrol strength of A1) + (% of A2 falling into tract A * patrol 
strength of A2) + (% of A3 falling into tract A * patrol strength of A3)]. 
 197. The BPD has twelve districts that provide policing services across Boston’s 
neighborhoods: A-1 serving Downtown, Beacon Hill, and Chinatown neighborhoods; 
A-15 serving Charlestown; A-7 serving East Boston; B-2 serving Roxbury and 
Mission Hill neighborhoods; B-3 serving Mattapan and parts of North Dorchester; C-
6 serving South Boston; C-11 serving most of Dorchester; D-4 serving Back Bay, 
Fenway, and South End neighborhoods; D-14 serving Allston and Brighton 
neighborhoods; E-5 serving West Roxbury and Roslindale neighborhoods; E-13 
serving Jamaica Plain; and E-18 serving Hyde Park.  The reference category for the 
BPD district dummy variable was E-13.  For a basic review of the use of dummy 
variables in regression models, see MELISSA A. HARDY, REGRESSION WITH DUMMY 
VARIABLES 7–16 (Sage U. Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the Soc. Sci., 
No. 07-093, 1993). 
 198. Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race, 
Crime, and Urban Inequality in CRIME AND INEQUALITY 38 (John Hagan & Ruth 
Peterson eds., 1995); Robert J. Sampson, Steven Raudenbush & Felton Earls, 
Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 
SCI. 918, 918 (1997); Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Robert J. Sampson & Steven Raudenbush, 
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disadvantage.199  The concentrated disadvantage index is a 
standardized index composed of the percentage of residents who are 
Black, the percentage of residents receiving public assistance, the 
percentage of families living below the poverty line, the percentage of 
female-headed households with children under the age of 18, and the 
percentage of unemployed residents (as measured by the percentage 
of men over the age 16 who did not work in the previous year).200  
Because we are explicitly interested the independent impact of race 
on the number of FIO reports in a neighborhood controlling for other 
factors, we excluded the percentage of Black residents from the 
construction of the Boston concentrated disadvantage used in this 
analysis.  Because of the high correlation among these variables, we 
conducted principal components factor analysis to identify the 
underlying dimensions among the variables.201  This procedure 
revealed that variables load on a single factor (which was retained as 
a standardized disadvantage index variable).202  The presence of 
concentrations of recent immigrants is a protective factor that reduces 
the risk of crime in a neighborhood.203  As such, we created a variable 
that measured the percentage of foreign-born residents in each 
Census tract. 
                                                                                                                                         
Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban 
Violence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 517, 518 (2001). 
 199. Sampson & Wilson, supra note 198, at 45; Morenoff, Sampson & Raudenbush, 
supra note 198, at 518. 
 200. Morenoff, Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 198, at 527. 
 201. Factor analysis is a statistical technique that captures consistency among 
observed variables to generate a composite measure using a lower number of 
unobserved variables.  The method produces factors that represent the correlations 
among the observed measures.  See JAE-ON KIM ET AL., FACTOR ANALYSIS:  
STATISTICAL METHODS AND PRACTICAL ISSUES at 8–9 (Sage U. Paper Series on 
Quantitative Applications in the Soc. Sci., No. 07-014, 1978).  The principal 
components factor analysis was completed using STATA 13.1. 
 202. For example, a Boston Census tract featuring a disadvantage index score of 
1.5 would be 1.5 standard deviations more disadvantaged than the mean Boston 
Census tract.  As such, the disadvantage index is adjusted specifically for the city of 
Boston using 2010 ACS variables, even while the components used to construct the 
index remain constant across much neighborhood research and remain robust 
predictors of crime across a variety of city types and spatial aggregations.  See 
Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, supra note 198, at 920–21; Morenoff, Sampson & 
Raudenbush, supra note 198, at 543–44. 
 203. See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson, Rethinking Crime and Immigration, 7 
CONTEXTS 28, 28–33 (2008), https://contexts.org/articles/files/2008/01/contexts_
winter08_sampson.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSM5-CZNC]. 
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3.  Benchmarks 
The selection of a benchmark against which to assess police 
enforcement activity is a basic question in reliably measuring the 
extent of racial disparities in police-citizen interactions. 204  A 
benchmark allows us to determine if Boston Police are selectively, on 
the basis of race or another prohibited factor, singling out persons for 
FIO reports.  As such, we compare the police decision to complete an 
FIO report on someone to their availability and eligibility for such 
reports, and compare that calculation across racial and ethnic groups.  
It is not hard to see that the reliability of an estimate of the extent of 
racial disproportionality or fairness is likely to depend on—and be 
particularly sensitive to—the benchmark used to measure criminal 
behavior. 
Population is one measure of the supply of people available to the 
police for surveillance and possibly stops.  However, there are 
constraints on local population estimates that limit its utility as a 
benchmark for the behavior of the police.  Residential population 
estimates in commercial parts of Boston are often unreliable 
estimates of the actual composition of persons who are visible and 
available to the police during certain hours of the day.  And, similarly, 
if people leave residential areas to work in commercial areas, the 
estimates in the residential areas will also be biased and inaccurate. 
Another reason that population may not be an incomplete 
benchmark is that BPD officers do not complete FIO reports 
randomly based on the population parameters of an area.205  In fact, 
                                                                                                                                         
 204. The issues in benchmarking for pedestrian stops can be different from those 
that influence decisions on how to benchmark for traffic stops.  See generally LORI A. 
FRIDELL, POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, BY THE NUMBERS: A GUIDE FOR 
ANALYZING DATA FROM VEHICLE STOPS (2004); Jeffrey Fagan, Law, Social Science 
and Racial Profiling, 4 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 104 (2002); Ian Ayres, Outcome Tests of 
Racial Disparities in Police Practices, 4 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 133 (2002); Greg 
Ridgeway & John MacDonald, Methods for Assessing Racially Biased Policing, in 
RACE, ETHNICITY AND POLICING: ESSENTIAL READINGS 180 (S.K. Rice & M.D. 
White eds., 2010). See also Samuel Walker, Searching for the Denominator: 
Problems with Police Traffic Stop Data and an Early Warning Solution, 4 JUST. RES. 
& POL’Y 133 (2002).  The Fagan and Walker articles respectively wrestle with the 
unique demands of benchmarking for pedestrian stops (comparing the adequacy of 
benchmarks based on racial composition of local populations, the distribution of 
behaviors associated with criminal activity, the racial composition of known criminal 
offenders or suspects, local area crime rates, or comparisons of the behaviors of 
police officers of different races confronting suspects of different races). 
 205. See BOS. POLICE DEP’T, RULE 323: FIELD INTERACTION/OBSERVATION/
ENCOUNTER REPORT (FIOE REPORT) (2015), http://static1.squarespace.com/static/
5086f19ce4b0ad16ff15598d/t/56a2569205caa7ee9f29e6a2/1453479570208/rule323.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2RQZ-PQ86]; JEFFREY FAGAN ET AL., FINAL REPORT: AN 
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police complete FIO reports of persons based on, at least in theory, 
their perceptions of suspected crime, or their evaluation of citizen 
behaviors that may provide reasonable indicia of the potential that a 
crime has occurred or is about to take place.206  To the extent that 
rates of crime suspicion are correlated with rates of crime 
commission, observed crime rates are useful candidates to serve as a 
component of a benchmark.207 
For this analysis of BPD FIO activity, a valid benchmark requires 
estimates of the supply of individuals of each racial or ethnic group 
who are engaged in the targeted behaviors and who are available to 
the police as targets of their stop authority and intelligence gathering 
activities.  Since police often target resources to the places where 
crime rates and risks are highest, and where populations are 
highest,208 some measure of population that is conditioned on crime 
rates is an optimal candidate for inclusion as a benchmark. 
The challenge in following this strategy is to identify a valid 
measure of crime.  Ideally, we would include measures of the race-
specific crime rates in each tract (or other social area) to help 
construct precise benchmarks based on the participation in the 
behavior of interest by persons of each race and ethnicity.  However, 
there are practical problems in this approach.  For example, many 
crimes are unreported to the police, and there are no valid victim 
surveys from which we can measure crime rates.209  There are 
similarly no surveys of self-reported crimes.210  Race-specific arrest 
rates have been used as a proxy for race-specific crime rates, with a 
                                                                                                                                         
ANALYSIS OF RACE AND ETHNICITY PATTERNS IN BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
FIELD INTERROGATION, OBSERVATION, FRISK, AND/OR SEARCH REPORTS 1–3 (2015). 
 206. Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth 
Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 829 (2011). 
 207. Geoffrey Alpert et al., supra note 98, at 411–13. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Josine Junger-Tas & Ineke Haen Marshall, The Self-Report Methodology in 
Crime Research, 25 CRIME & JUST. 291, 292 (1999).  However, the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics manages the National Crime Victimization Survey, “in which interviewed 
persons are asked about the number and characteristics of victimizations experienced 
during the prior 6 months” and extrapolates crime rates based off the information 
from the survey. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., DATA COLLECTION: NATIONAL CRIME 
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY (NCVS) (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dc
detail&iid=245 [https://perma.cc/U953-LYL3]; Jennifer L. Truman & Lynn Langston, 
Criminal Victimization, 2014, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Sept. 29, 2015, at 1, 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv14.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WAG-WGVF]; LYNN 
LANGSTON ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VICTIMIZATIONS NOT REPORTED TO THE 
POLICE 1 (2012). 
 210. See also Junger-Tas & Marshall, supra note 209, at 348–53 (assessing 
drawbacks of self-report studies). 
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lag function that reduces (but hardly eliminates) the problem of 
correlated error terms between current enforcement and past 
enforcement.211  However, there is strong disagreement about the 
validity of prior arrest rates, with some analysts offering positive 
rationales,212 while others have been critical.213 
An alternative measure is crimes reported to the police.  However, 
crime reports do not provide a complete picture of the racial makeup 
of the offenders in those crimes.214  While crime reports may provide 
a snapshot of the racial composition of those involved in crime 
commission, it is just that: a snapshot with only partial coverage of 
criminal activity.  The data are further limited by the fact that many 
reported crimes lack a suspect identification or description.215  
Moreover, some types of suspected crimes that motivate FIO activity, 
such as weapons possession or drug possession, often do not follow 
from crime reports that identify the race of a suspect, so these base 
rates of offending are unknown.216  Calls for service to the police are 
yet a third index, but 911 calls of this sort are difficult to apply to 
proactive patrol or the “new policing” given varying incidents of 
                                                                                                                                         
 211. See, e.g., FAGAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 309, 310; Gelman, Fagan & Kiss, 
supra note 79, at 813. 
 212. Expert Report of Dennis Smith at 22–26, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. 
Supp. 2d 540, No. 08 Civ. 01034 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2010) (arguing that arrest 
statistics reveal patterns of crime suspects that can inform analyses of racial bias in 
police activity). 
 213. Arrest data incorporate information about crime patterns, but also contain 
uncertainty about unobservable components because of police decisions about 
allocating officers to specific places. See generally Greg Ridgeway & John 
MacDonald, Methods for Assessing Racially Biased Policing, in RACE, ETHNICITY 
AND POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL READINGS 180 (S.K. Rice & M.D. White eds., 
2010). 
 214. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 2014, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/
crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-43 [https://perma.cc/N2PD-NUAB] (noting that 
not all agencies provided ethnicity breakdowns of offenders); see generally WILLIAM 
BRATTON, N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, CRIME AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY IN NEW YORK 
CITY (JAN. 1- DEC. 31, 2015), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_
and_planning/year_end_2015_enforcement_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/T63L-
PGSA]; see also Dov Fox, The Second Generation of Racial Profiling, 38 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 49, 49–50 (2010). 
 215. Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data with 
the Power to Inspire Political Action, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 262 n.349 
(2003). 
 216. Lesser included offenses are not always included on crime reports.  However, 
the FBI does frequently collect lesser included offenses for its hate crime database.  
See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, LAW ENF’T SUPPORT SECTION & CRIME 
STATISTICS MGMT. UNIT HATE CRIME DATA COLLECTION GUIDELINES AND 
TRAINING MANUAL 52 (2015), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime-data-
collection-guidelines-and-training-manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AAL-X8YH]. 
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mistaken reports and the heterogeneity of the purpose of the calls 
that include serious crimes, cats in trees, multiple reports of the same 
gunshot, domestic disturbances, or car break-ins.217 
To the extent that observed or reported crimes are leading 
indicators of those behaviors that are correlated with crime, crimes 
known to the police are important part of a valid benchmark.  So too 
is population, as an index of the overall exposure of citizen as 
available targets for surveillance and interdiction.  Accordingly, these 
analyses use both population and reported crime as benchmarks for 
understanding the racial distribution of FIO reports.  Sensitivity tests 
applied alternate benchmarks including lagged race-specific arrest 
rates218 and lagged race-specific suspect rates.219  Natural log of the 
Census tract population, total number of arrested individuals in 
Census tract, and total number of suspects reported in Census tract 
were used as the offsets in the regression models. 
These analyses were designed to test whether monthly counts of 
FIO reports in Census tracts were disproportionate to the racial 
composition of tract residents, racial composition of arrested suspects 
in the tract, and the racial composition of crime suspects as reported 
by victims in crime incident reports, after controlling for the known 
crime rate in the previous month and other characteristics that are 
correlated with crime.  For each racial composition benchmark, three 
race categories (percent Black, percent Hispanic, and percent Asian 
or other) are included and the category of percent White is omitted.  
                                                                                                                                         
 217. Robin S. Engel, Michael R. Smith & Francis T. Cullen, Race, Place, and Drug 
Enforcement, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 603, 605 (2012) (claiming that 911 calls 
are a more robust and accurate measure of the relative crime problems in an area 
than are either arrests or reported crimes).  But see Stephen D. Mastrofski, Race, 
Policing, and Equity, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 593, 597 (2012) (critiquing the 
use of 911 calls as a basis of suspicion to either allocate officers or justify the 
formation of suspicions necessary for a valid Terry stop or probable cause for a 
search or an arrest). 
 218. Between 2007 and 2010, the BPD arrested 28,427 suspects.  The racial 
distribution of arrested suspects was as follows: 50.4% Black, 26.8% White, 20.6% 
Hispanic, and 2.2% Asian or other race category.  Using ArcGIS 10.2 mapping 
software, the BRIC was able to geocode 24,590 of these arrests to their respective 
Census tracts (86.5% of 28,427 total arrests).  While a 100% geocoding rate is always 
desired, the geocode rate in the current study exceeds the minimum acceptable 
threshold of 85%. See Jerry H. Ratcliffe, Geocoding Crime and a First Estimate of a 
Minimum Acceptable Hit Rate, 18 INT’L J. GEOGRAPHICAL INFO. SCI. 61, 61–72 
(2004). 
 219. As described earlier, between 2007 and 2010, there were 113,419 Part I UCR 
crime incidents in Boston.  Victims in these incidents reported information on 
340,585 suspects.  The racial distribution of these suspects was as follows: 41.2% 
Black, 21.8% White, 17.3% Hispanic, 2.0% Asian or other race category, and 17.7% 
unknown race. 
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This was done to avoid collinearity in the model estimation.  As such, 
the coefficients for each racial group are based on comparison with 
the percent White of the benchmark in the tract.  When a racial 
composition variable is significant, this means that its relationship to 
FIO activity is significantly different from that of the White racial 
composition of that benchmark in the Census tract.  The parameter 
estimates were expressed as incidence rate ratios (i.e., exponentiated 
coefficients)220 and robust standard errors clustered by tracts were 
used.221 
III.  RESULTS 
A.  Suspects and Officers 
Table 1 shows the characteristics of both suspects and officers.  
Suspect identifiers were available for 199,331 (97.4% of 204,739) FIO 
encounters between 2007 and 2010.222  From these, we were able to 
identify N = 72,619 unique subjects.  Using gang intelligence 
databases maintained by BPD, we estimated that 5.5% (3967 of 
72,619) of the suspects in FIO encounters were classified as gang 
members.223  The number of FIO’s per suspect ranged from 1 to 249, 
                                                                                                                                         
 220. Incidence rate ratios are interpreted as the rate at which things occur; for 
example, an incidence rate ratio of 1.10 would suggest that, controlling for other 
independent variables, a one unit increase in the selected independent variable was 
associated with a ten percent increase in the rate at which the dependent variable 
occurs. See SOPHIA RABE-HESKETH & ANDERS SKRONDAL, MULTILEVEL AND 
LONGITUDINAL MODELING USING STATA, VOLUME II: CATEGORICAL RESPONSES, 
COUNTS AND SURVIVAL 374–76 (2005);  see also KENNETH ROTHMAN & S. 
GREENLAND, MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 34–36 (2008). 
 221. Greg Ridgeway & John MacDonald, Doubly Robust Internal Benchmarking 
and False Discovery Rates for Detecting Racial Bias in Police Stops, 104 J. AM. STAT. 
ASS’N 661, 664 (2009); see also Gary King & Margaret E. Roberts, How Robust 
Standard Errors Expose Methodological Problems They Do Not Fix, and What to 
Do About It, 23 POL. ANALYSIS 159, 161–64 (2015). 
 222. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 5, 6 tbl. 1; see also CITY OF BOSTON, BOSTON 
POLICE DEPARTMENT FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, 
https://data.cityofboston.gov/Public-Safety/Boston-Police-Department-FIO/xmmk-
i78r [https://perma.cc/RMT5-VCCP] (for information about FIO encounters between 
2011 and 2015). 
 223. See ANTHONY A. BRAGA, DAVID M. HUREAU, & LEIGH GROSSMAN, 
MANAGING THE GROUP VIOLENCE INTERVENTION: USING SHOOTING SCORECARDS 
TO TRACK GROUP VIOLENCE 15 (2014).  The Boston Regional Intelligence Center 
(BRIC) created a classification system using several parameters to identify 
individuals as gang members.  To be classified as a gang member by BRIC, a person 
has to accumulate ten points based upon the following criteria: prior validation by a 
BRIC-affiliated criminal justice agency that uses the same selection criteria (nine 
points), prior validation by a non-BRIC-affiliated criminal justice agency that uses 
similar selection criteria (eight points), self-admitted gang membership (eight points), 
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with an average of 2.74 FIO events per suspect, during the study 
period.224  About half (48.5%) had been arrested, with the number of 
arrests ranged from 1 to 63, with a mean of 5 arrests.225 
 
   
                                                                                                                                         
use and/or possession of gang paraphernalia or identifiers (four points), gang-related 
photograph (two points), known gang tattoo or marking (eight points), information 
from reliable confidential informant (five points), information from anonymous 
source or tipster (one point), crime victim associated with rival gang (three or eight 
points depending on incarceration status), possession of gang documents such as by-
laws (three or eight points depending on incarceration status), possession of gang 
publications (two points), participation in gang publication (eight points), possession 
of court and/or investigative documents involving an identified gang member (nine 
points), possession of printed or electronic media indicating membership (one point), 
contact with known gang members via FIO reports (two points per report), named in 
police incident report involving known gang member (four points per report), 
possession of gang membership material (nine points), information developed during 
surveillance and/or surveillance (five points), and other information (one point).  Id. 
at 15 n.2. 
 224. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 5; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222. 
 225. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 5; see also Shima Baradaran & Frank L. 
McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 536 (2012) (“A person’s number 
of previous arrests is a large predictor of future re-arrest; however, whether or not 
that prior arrest turned into a conviction is largely irrelevant as an additional 
predictor.”); Avinash Singh Bhati & Alex R. Piquero, Estimating the Impact of 
Incarceration on Subsequent Offending Trajectories: Deterrent, Criminogenic, or 
Null Effect?, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 207, 216 (2007) (“[P]rior arrests were 
associated with recidivism.”). 
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Table 1.  Age, Gender, and Race of Unique BPD FIO Subjects and Officers 
 FIO Subjects, 
N=72,619  
FIO Officers, 
N=1750a 
 N Percent  N Percent 
Gender      
Male 59,438 81.8  1,558 89 
Female 13,181 18.2  192 11 
Age      
Below 18 9,201 12.7  0 0 
18–24 24,471 33.7  10 0.6 
25–30 12,375 17  208 11.9 
31–35 6,417 8.8  286 16.3 
36–40 5,636 7.8  356 20.3 
41–50 9,650 13.3  609 34.8 
51 and older 4,869 6.7  281 16.1 
      
Mean 29.2   41.3  
Median  26   41  
Range 12 to 71 years   23 to 64 years 
Race       
Black 30,849 42.5  418 23.9 
White 25,758 35.5  1,139 65.1 
Hispanic 9,693 13.3  150 8.6 
Asian / Other 1,321 1.8  43 2.5 
Unknown 4,998 6.9  0 0 
Selected Characteristics      
Subjects      
     Gang member 3,967 5.5    
     Prior arrest (1+) 35,256 48.5    
Officers      
    Gang Unit (YVSF) 65 3.7    
    Detective (any rank) 212 12.1    
    Patrol Officer 1,379 78.8    
    Patrol Sergeant 130 7.4    
    Patrol Lieutenant / Captain 23 1.3    
    Dep. Supt. / Superintendent 6 0.3       
Note: a. These are the officers who have had one or more FIO encounter over the study interval. 
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Most suspects were young: nearly half were younger than 25 years 
of age.226  One in three (33.7%) were between 18 and 24 years of 
age.227  Most were male (81.8%), consistent with known gender 
differences in crime rates by gender.228  Most suspects were Black 
(42.5%) or Hispanic (13.3%), each above their respective share of 
population in Boston in the 2010 census.229  Whites were under-
represented in the FIO subject pool relative to population share. 230 
As we discussed earlier, population is a weak benchmark, and we 
control for local crime rates in subsequent analyses. 
About half of the FIO suspects (48.5%) had one or more prior 
arrests, and half did not.231  To the extent that stops in general carry 
                                                                                                                                         
 226. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 5; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222; Bhati & Piquero, supra 
note 225, at 216 (“[A]ge was inversely associated with recidivism (older offenders 
were less likely to recidivate).”). 
 227. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 5. 
 228. Id.; see also UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 228; Janet L. Lauritsen, 
Karen Heimer & James P. Lynch, Trends in the Gender Gap in Violent Offending: 
New Evidence from the National Crime Victimization Survey, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 361, 
362 (2009); Bhati & Piquero, supra note 225, at 216–17. 
 229. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 5; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 Census 
Interactive Population Search, Boston City, Massachusetts, http://www.census.gov/
2010census/popmap/ipmtext.php?fl=25:2507000 [https://perma.cc/ME59-MWY4]; 
Bos. Police Dep’t, Boston Police Commissioner Announces Field Interrogation and 
Observation (FIO) Study Results, Oct. 8, 2014, http://bpdnews.com/news/2014/10/8/
boston-police-commissioner-announces-field-interrogation-and-observation-fio-
study-results [https://perma.cc/R7EE-52JQ] (“It also showed that Black subjects are 
8% more likely to be stopped repeatedly and 12% more likely to be frisked and 
searched when controlling for other factors like Criminal History and Gang 
Membership in Violent Crime areas.”); Marina Carver, Study Finds Boston Police 
Target African-Americans Disproportionately, CNN (Oct. 9, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/09/us/boston-police-stop-frisk/ [https://perma.cc/64V8-
F7W4]; Sebastian Murdock, The Staggering Racial Disparity In Boston’s Police 
Encounters, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/10/08/stop-and-frisk-boston_n_5953688.html [https://perma.cc/BD7S-W9HW].  
The American Civil Liberties Union also produced a report on the impact of BPD’s 
policing. See AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, BLACK, BROWN AND TARGETED 1 (2014), 
https://aclum.org/app/uploads/2015/06/reports-black-brown-and-targeted.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q5K7-DQQT].  See also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT FIO:  BPD 
FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 236. 
 230. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 5; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 Census 
Interactive Population Search: Boston City, Massachusetts, http://www.census.gov/
2010census/popmap/ipmtext.php?fl=25:2507000 [https://perma.cc/5J3Z-W9YX] (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2016); see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT FIO: BPD FIO FROM 
2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222. 
 231. Bhati & Piquero, supra note 225, at 216; see also BOSTON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222. 
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risks of social and psychological harms,232 the reach of FIOs to 
persons with no prior record extends an umbrella of suspicion to a 
group of primarily young people with no known criminal 
involvement. 
Gangs are a focus of Boston police tactics.233  Yet few of the FIO 
suspects (5.5%) were known to the police as gang members.234  The 
department’s gang unit was proportionately small, with 3.7% of the 
population of officers who were in the FIO database.235 
BPD Officers were older,236 not surprisingly, but their age 
distribution suggests that they were experienced.  More than half 
were over 40 years of age (50.9%), with a median age of 41.3 years.237  
Nearly two officers in three were White (65.1%), and about one in 
four was Black (23.9%).238  Most were assigned to patrol commands, 
with about one in eight (12.1%) holding a detective’s shield.239 
                                                                                                                                         
 232. Stuntz, supra note 67, at 1218; see also Ekow N. Yankah, Policing Ourselves: 
A Republican Theory of Citizenship, Dignity and Policing–A Comment on Fagan 2–
3 (Cardozo Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 400, 2013), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2258048 [https://perma.cc/385T-7A93]. 
 233. See BRAGA, HUREAU, & GROSSMAN, supra note 223, at 13–14. 
 234. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 7; BRAGA, HUREAU, & GROSSMAN, supra 
note 223, at 13–14. But see Boston Police Commissioner Announces Field 
Interrogation and Observation (FIO) Study Results, supra note 229 (“Gang 
Membership and prior arrest history are very strong predictors of repeated FIO’s.”); 
Bos. Police Dep’t, Commissioner Evans Continues Efforts to Increase Transparency 
and Accountability of Policing Activities to the Public, Jan. 8, 2016, 
http://bpdnews.com/news/2016/1/7/commissioner-evans-continues-efforts-to-increase-
transparency-and-accountability-of-policing-activities-to-the-public [https://perma.cc/
5FFZ-XLSV] (“[O]fficers were repeatedly stopping or observing individuals with 
criminal records and/or gang affiliation.”). 
 235. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 7; see Bos. Police Dep’t, Operation 
Ceasefire, http://bpdnews.com/operation-ceasefire/ [https://perma.cc/GY56-HZH8]; 
see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, 
supra note 222. 
 236. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 7. 
 237. Id.  Similarly, in 2010, the median age of the Boston police force was 44.32 
years. BOS. POLICE DEP’T, ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2010), http://static1.squarespace.com/
static/5086f19ce4b0ad16ff15598d/t/511a8170e4b0d00cab69226e/1360691568147/Annu
al+Report+2010-small.pdf [https://perma.cc/U78V-DYNN]. 
 238. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 7; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
FIO:  BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222.  Similarly, in its 2015 
Workforce Report, the City indicated that about 66% of the Police Department was 
White, 23% was Black, 9% was Hispanic, and 2% was Other. CITY OF BOSTON, 2015 
WORKFORCE REPORT 16 (2015), https://www.cityofboston.gov/images_documents/
2015.04.14%20Final%20Draft-UPDATED_City%20of%20Boston%20Workforce%20
Profile%20Report_tcm3-50873.pdf [https://perma.cc/66PG-UCH7]. 
 239. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 7; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222. 
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The number of repeat FIO reports per subject is concentrated 
among a small number of individuals who experience large numbers 
of FIO encounters.240  Table 2 shows that about two FIO subjects in 
three (67.5%) experienced one FIO.241  As a group, they accounted 
for 24.6% of the total number of FIO reports from 2007–2010.242  
About one in twenty (5.2%) experienced ten or more FIOs and, as a 
group, accounted for 40.2% of the total number of FIO reports made 
by BPD officers during this time.243 
 
Table 2.  FIO Report Distribution by Unique Subjects 
 N 
Subjects  
% 
Subjects 
Cum. %  
Subjects 
 
Sum FIOs 
 Cum. % 
FIOs N of FIOs  % FIOs  
51+  211 0.3 0.3 14,886 7.5 7.5 
25–50  671 0.9 1.2 22,314 11.2 18.7 
10–24  2,933 4 5.2 42,787 21.5 40.2 
5–9  4,926 6.8 12 31,798 15.9 56.1 
2–4  14,860 20.5 32.5 38,528 19.3 75.4 
1 only  49,018 67.5 100 49,018 24.6 100 
Total 72,619 100 100 199,331 100 100 
 
FIO forms also report the badge numbers of the BPD officers who 
filled out the reports.244  Officer badge numbers were available for 
N=200,103 FIO reports (97.7% of 204,739).245  BPD personnel records 
                                                                                                                                         
 240. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 7, 7 tbl. 2; Boston Police Commissioner 
Announces Field Interrogation and Observation (FIO) Study Results, supra note 
229; Commissioner Evans Continues Efforts to Increase Transparency and 
Accountability of Policing Activities to the Public, supra note 234. 
 241. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 7; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222. 
 242. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 7; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
FIO:  BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222. 
 243. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 7; Boston Police Commissioner Announces 
Field Interrogation and Observation (FIO) Study Results, supra note 229 (noting that 
“5% of the individuals FIO’ed account for more than 40% of the total FIO reports”); 
Commissioner Evans Continues Efforts to Increase Transparency and Accountability 
of Policing Activities to the Public, supra note 234. 
 244. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 8; see also AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, supra 
note 229, at 7 (copy of a FIO report); see also BOS. POLICE DEP’T, RULE 323: FIELD 
INTERACTION/OBSERVATION/ENCOUNTER REPORT (FIOE REPORT) (2015), 
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5086f19ce4b0ad16ff15598d/t/56a2569205caa7ee9f
29e6a2/1453479570208/rule323.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9CZ-MXTA]. 
 245. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 8; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
FIO:  BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222. 
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identified 2359 unique officers in its workforce between 2007 and 
2010, including new hires and retirements during that time period.246  
Personnel records were used to determine officer demographic 
information, years on the job, rank, assignment, and detective status 
for all sworn BPD officers.  Badge numbers on FIO reports were used 
to identify the N=1,750 unique BPD officers. 
 
Table 3.  FIO Report Distribution by Unique BPD Officers 
N of  N 
Officers  
% Cum. % 
Officers 
Sum 
FIOs 
%  Cum. % 
FIO FIOs  Officers FIO 
1,000+  28 1.2 1.2 42,399 21.2 21.2 
500 - 999  65 2.8 4 44,153 22.1 43.3 
250 - 499  128 5.4 9.4 44,809 22.4 65.7 
100 - 249  253 10.7 20.1 39,693 19.8 85.5 
50 - 99  214 9.1 29.2 15,179 7.6 93.1 
1 - 49 1,062 45 74.2 13,870 6.9 100 
Zero  609 25.8 100 0 0 100 
Total  2,359 100 100 200,103 100 100 
 
About three officers in four (74.2% of 2359) made one or more 
FIO reports between 2007 and 2010.247  The counts ranged from 1 to 
2315 FIOs.248  Officers averaged 84.3 FIOs over the four years, or 21 
per year.249  Table 3 shows that, similar to the distribution of repeat 
FIOs among subjects, the number of repeat FIO reports per officer is 
also highly concentrated among a small number of individuals (Table 
3).250  Nearly half (45.0%) generated fewer than 50 FIO reports and, 
as a group, accounted for 6.9% of the total number of FIO reports 
during the study time period.251  A small group (4.0%, or 
approximately 70 officers) generated 500 or more FIOs; they 
                                                                                                                                         
 246. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 8; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
FIO:  BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222. 
 247. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 8; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
FIO:  BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222. 
 248. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 8; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
FIO:  BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222. 
 249. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 8; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
FIO:  BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222. 
 250. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 8; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
FIO:  BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222. 
 251. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 8; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
FIO:  BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222. 
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accounted for 43.3% of the total number of FIO reports made by 
BPD officers from 2007 to 2010.252 
B.  Race, Crime, and FIO’s 
1.  FIOs by Neighborhood Crime and Social Conditions 
Table 4 shows the results of the estimates of FIO activity using 
alternate benchmarks for racial composition.  The monthly number of 
total Index crimes (logged, lagged) in a tract was a consistently 
significant positive predictor of the monthly count of FIO reports in a 
tract across models with varying benchmarks.  This suggests that the 
intensity of BPD FIO activity in a tract is associated with the amount 
of serious crime experienced in a tract controlling for other 
conditions.  An increase of 1% more total index crime incidents in the 
previous month leads to an increase of 10.6% (IRR=1.106) FIO 
reports in the following month. This is a large effect, considering that 
the average Boston census tract experiences 12.2 index crimes per 
month.  Each of the models in Table 4 show that the Boston police 
prioritized crime problems in the allocation of FIO activity by tract 
and police district during this period. 
  
                                                                                                                                         
 252. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 8; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
FIO:  BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222. 
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Table 4.  Negative Binomial Regressions of Monthly FIO Report Counts 
Controlling for Census Tract Characteristics, Crime, Police Activity, and 
Other Conditions for Three Racial Benchmarks (IRR, SE, p) 
 Residents Arrestees Crime Suspects 
Percent Black 1.022 (.006) ** 1.025 (.005) ** 1.029 (.009) ** 
Percent Hispanic 1.041 (.008)** 1.016 (.008) * 1.040 (.011) ** 
Percent Asian / other  1.020 (.012) 0.917 (.052) 0.967 (.063) 
Percent Unknown Race     ----    ---- 0.922 (.015) ** 
Total Crime  
(logged, lagged) 
1.106 (.026) ** 1.125 (.036) ** 1.091 (.027) ** 
Disadvantage Index 0.894 (.157) 0.911 (.178) 0.924 (.143) 
Percent Foreign Born 1.016 (.009) + 1.017 (.007) * 1.019 (.009) * 
Patrol Strength 1.006 (.006) 1.002 (.005) 1.006 (.006) 
Moran’s I (lagged) 1.285 (.369) 1.124 (.280) 1.054 (.282) 
Constant 0.063 (.052) ** 0.168 (.131) * 0.916 (.035) ** 
District Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes 
Season Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes 
Standard Errors 
Clustered by Tract? 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,303 8,303 8,303 
Groups 173 173 173 
Wald Chi-Square 460.36 492.63 582.82 
Wald degrees of 
freedom 
25 25 26 
Wald Chi-Square p .000 .000 .000 
Notes: Estimates reported as Incident Rate Ratios.  Robust standard errors were clustered 
by census tract.  Percent White is the reference category for the resident, arrestee, and 
suspect race dummy variables.  The natural log of the total number of residents, total 
number of arrestees, and total number of suspects for each tract-month were used as 
exposure offsets in the respective regression models. 
Significance: + p<= .10, * p<=.05, ** p<=.01 
 
After controlling for crime, Table 4 also shows that the racial 
composition variables for percent Black and percent Hispanic are 
positive and significant for all three models.  The pattern of race 
effects suggests evidence of disparate treatment in FIO activity based 
on neighborhood racial composition.  After controlling for local crime 
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rates, we observe higher rates of FIO activity for census tracts based 
on their Black or Hispanic racial composition, whether in residents, 
arrestees, or the race of known crime suspects.  In each of these 
specifications, the percentage of Foreign Born Residents in a tract 
was also a statistically-significant predictor of increased FIO activity.  
Since foreign born residents of Boston are primarily persons of color, 
the focus of FIO activity in those neighborhoods reinforces the notion 
of disparate treatment by race and ethnicity. 
The consistent size and direction of the race and ethnicity 
coefficients suggests a robust race effect controlling for crime, police 
activity, and other relevant factors, even if they were modest in size.  
Still, even modest effects can have practical significance. The disparity 
in the monthly count of FIO reports can be meaningful in census 
tracts with larger shares of minority residents, arrestees, and reported 
suspects.  Using the residential racial composition variable as an 
example, the incidence rate ratio on percent Black suggests that a 
one-unit increase in the Black percentage of residents relative to the 
White percentage of residents in a Census tract is associated with a 
2.2% increase (IRR=1.022) in the monthly count of FIO reports made 
by the BPD controlling for crime and other factors.  The effects of 
race (and foreign born residents) in Table 4 were observed after 
controlling for the number of officers deployed in each police district, 
a measure of the exposure of local residents to police and their 
availability for FIO contacts. 
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Figure 2.  Predicted Counts of FIO’s per Month by Percent Black and 
Hispanic Residents in Tract, 2007–2010, Controlling for Crime & 
Social Conditions
 
 
Figure 2 shows the marginal increase in the predicted count of 
monthly FIO reports in a census tract as the percentages of Black and 
Hispanic residents in a tract increase.  The figure shows the nearly 
linear and monotonic increase in the adjusted (for predictors) 
monthly count of FIO reports increases as the percentages of 
minority residents increases in a tract.  Simply to illustrate, Figure 2 
shows that a tract with 85% Black residents would experience an 
additional 53 FIO reports per month compared to a tract with 15% 
Black residents.253  Over the course of one year, residents in that tract 
                                                                                                                                         
 253. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 9–10; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
FIO: BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222.  The trend of hyper-
policing of majority Black neighborhoods can be observed in other cities as well. See, 
e.g., AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO 3 (2015), 
http://www.aclu-il.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ACLU_StopandFrisk_6.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QS3H-38KF] (“Stop and frisk is disproportionately concentrated in 
the black community.  Black Chicagoans were subjected to 72% of all stops, yet 
constitute just 32% of the city’s population.”); N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, STOP & 
FRISK DURING THE BLOOMBERG ADMINISTRATION:  2002–2013 1 (2014), 
http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/stopandfrisk_briefer_2002-2013_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C3KU-EV5A] (“In 70 out of 76 precincts, black and Latino New 
Yorkers accounted for more than 50% of stops, and in 32 precincts they accounted 
for more than 90% of stops.  In six of the 10 precincts with the lowest black and 
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would be subjected to an additional 636 FIO reports and, over the 
four-year study time period, this difference would represent an 
additional 2544 FIO reports in that tract.254 
Because crime and racial composition are unevenly distributed 
across tracts and neighborhoods in Boston, similar to other cities, we 
tested for the possible leverage of outliers in the estimates in Table 
4.255  That is, both of the central findings in Table 4 on crime and race 
could reflect the undue leverage and influence of neighborhood 
outliers in each of these distributions.256  For example, Figure 2 shows 
the concentration of crimes and race in particular corners of the city.  
To test for the effects of outliers, we conducted a sensitivity test by 
trimming 20% of tracts at the extremes of the FIO activity 
distributions.  The results were largely unchanged.  Using a 
population benchmark (Model 1 in Table 4), the IRR for percent 
Black population decline from 1.022 to 1.018 in the narrower model.  
For crime, the IRR of crime on FIO counts dropped from 1.106 to 
1.088.  In other words, the FIO / race / crime relationship is robust to 
the removal of the extremes. 
2.  FIO Activity by Suspect Characteristics 
FIOs are a first-stage intrusion by police on individual liberty and 
privacy.  But in Boston, the use of non-contact FIOs carries a lower 
level of intrusion.  While privacy may be violated in the sense that 
one’s movements in these contacts are recorded by a police officer 
acting on behalf of the state, a non-contact incident does not have the 
same physical intrusion nor temporary detention and liberty 
implications of a full contact stop.257  To compare race effects on 
contact versus non-contact encounters, we estimated negative 
binomial regressions of subject race and other individual 
characteristics on FIO counts.  The models were estimated with and 
without gang membership status and arrest history to examine how 
                                                                                                                                         
Latino populations (such as the 6th Precinct in Greenwich Village), blacks and 
Latinos accounted for about 70% or more of stops.”). 
 254. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 9–10; see also BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
FIO:  BPD FIO FROM 2011 THRU JUNE 2015, supra note 222. 
 255. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 10; Krivo et al., Segregation, Racial 
Structure, and Neighborhood Violent Crime, supra note 24, at 1766–68. 
 256. For an example of an estimation of leverage effects of outliers, see Richard A. 
Berk, New Claims About Executions and General Deterrence: Déja Vu All Over 
Again?, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 303, 320–24 (2005) (showing the undue 
influence of Texas in state-year fixed effects estimates of the deterrent effects of 
executions on homicides). 
 257. FAGAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 11. 
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individual criminality might mediate any observed race effects.  
Model 1 in Table 5 shows the results for all FIO encounters.  Model 2 
controls for arrest history and gang membership, an adjustment that 
acknowledges the more intense surveillance and contact rates with 
suspected gang members or persons suspected by the police to be 
involved in criminal activity.  Model 3 re-estimates Model 2 for only 
non-contact FIO encounters. 
 
Table 5.  Negative Binomial Regression of the Number of FIO Reports by 
Individual Suspect Characteristics Controlling for Gang Membership (IRR, SE, p) 
       Non-Contact 
   All FIO Reports FIO Reports 
   Model 1  Model 2   Model 3 
Black Suspect  1.725 (.026) ** 1.088 (.011) ** 1.047 (.010) ** 
Hispanic Suspect  1.136 (.026) ** 0.969 (.013) *  0.972 (.012) * 
Asian / Other Suspect  0.725 (.024) ** 0.791 (.021) ** 0.757 (.021) ** 
Unknown Race  0.501 (.007) ** 0.681 (.007) ** 0.483 (.007) ** 
Age   0.990 (.001) ** 0.988 (.001) ** 0.979 (.001) ** 
Female Suspect   0.670 (.011) ** 0.830 (.009) ** 0.811 (.008) ** 
Gang Member  ----  3.339 (.076) ** 4.171 (.075) ** 
Arrest History   ----  1.108 (.001) ** 1.151 (.001) ** 
Constant   2.788 (.058) ** 2.103 (.029) ** 2.091 (.029) ** 
District Fixed Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Season Fixed Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
SE’s Clustered by Tract?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations   72,619  72,619  72,619 
Log Pseudo-likelihood  -153,503.52  -133,092.42  -117,323.91 
Wald Chi-Square  9,269.43  22,813.61  19,112.43 
Wald Chi-Square p  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: Models estimated with robust standard errors clustered by tract.  Race variables contrasted with 
White.   
Significance: + p<=.10, * p<=.05, ** p<=.01    
 
In Model 1, Black and Hispanic suspects have significantly higher 
FIO activity compared to Whites.258  The effect size for Blacks is 
especially large and more modest for Hispanic suspects.259  For Asian 
                                                                                                                                         
 258. See supra Table 5. 
 259. See id. 
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and Other Race suspects, they are less likely to be the subject of an 
FIO encounter compared to Whites, and the results also are 
significant.260  Older suspects and females are less likely to be subjects 
of FIO encounters.261 
Comparing Models 1 and 2, prior arrest history and gang 
membership each mediate the influence of race on the number of FIO 
encounters experienced by subjects, reducing the size of the race 
estimates but they remain statistically significant.262  Model 1 shows 
that compared to White subjects, Black subjects experienced 72.5% 
more FIO encounters per month across the city and Hispanic subjects 
experienced 13.6% more FIO encounters.263  When the prior arrest 
and gang status covariates are included, in Model 2, Black subjects 
experienced only 8.8% more FIO encounters per month and Hispanic 
subjects experienced 3.1% fewer FIO encounters compared to their 
White counterparts.264  The results for Asians and Other or Unknown 
race suspects remains unchanged.265  Gangs evidently are a priority in 
using FIO authority, and account for at least some of the racial 
disparity in FIO encounters. 
The pattern for non-contact FIO activity in Model 3 is similar to 
the pattern shown in Model 2.266  The effects of gang membership 
increase from Model 2 to Model 3, suggesting even greater attention 
to gang members, albeit without contact or interpersonal 
interaction.267  This makes sense, since gang members or reputed gang 
members are well known to the specialized Youth Violence Strike 
Force (YVSF, informally known as the gang unit), and their 
observations can be recorded for surveillance and intelligence 
purposes.268  Perhaps observing gang member movements and 
associations has intelligence payoffs, which might explain and 
rationalize the use of police powers in this way.  Since there is a 
privacy but not liberty interest at stake in these non-contact 
encounters, there is little regulatory leverage in this practice. 
                                                                                                                                         
 260. See id. 
 261. See id. 
 262. See id. 
 263. See id. 
 264. See id. 
 265. See id. 
 266. See id. 
 267. See id. 
 268. Allison Manning, Boston Police Data Shows Black Men Were Stopped Most 
Often, BOSTON.COM (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.boston.com/news/local-
news/2016/01/19/boston-police-data-shows-black-men-were-stopped-most-often 
[https://perma.cc/J6KR-UZN8]. 
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The importance of Table 5 is the finding suggesting intense police 
attention to gang members by the Boston police.  Gangs are thought 
to be an important source of the city’s gun violence problem, which 
leads to this attention, and gang membership also is skewed by both 
individual and neighborhood racial composition.269 
3.  Frisks and Searches by Suspect Race 
Table 6 shows that Black and Hispanic suspects were more likely to 
be frisked or searched during an FIO encounter, after controlling for 
non-racial suspect characteristics.270  Compared to White suspects, 
Black suspects were 12.4% more likely to be frisked / searched, and 
Hispanic subjects were 4.5% more likely to be frisked / searched 
during FIO encounters with arrest and gang status covariates included 
in the model.271  Gang members were 11.7% more likely to be frisked 
/ searched during FIO encounters relative to their non-gang 
counterparts, controlling for other factors.272  For every additional 
arrest in their history, suspects were 1.8% more likely to be frisked or 
searched during FIO encounters.273  Asian and other race subjects 
were significantly less likely to be frisked / searched during FIO 
encounters when compared to White subjects.274  Here, the gang 
effect that explained FIO activity in Table 5 seems to have 
comparable and independent influence on the decision to frisk as 
does the suspect’s race. 
 
   
                                                                                                                                         
 269. See Anthony A. Braga, David M. Hureau & Andrew V. Papachristos, 
Deterring Gang-Involved Gun Violence: Measuring the Impact of Boston’s 
Operation Ceasefire on Street Gang Behavior, 30 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 
113, 118 (2013) [hereinafter Deterring Gang Gun Violence]; Andrew V. Papachristos, 
David M. Hureau & Anthony A. Braga, The Corner and the Crew: The Influence of 
Geography and Social Networks on Gang Violence, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 417, 426, 438 
(2013) [hereinafter The Corner and the Crew]; Anthony A. Braga, David Hureau & 
Christopher Winship, Losing Faith? Police, Black Churches and the Resurgence of 
Youth Violence in Boston, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 141, 154 (2008) [hereinafter Losing 
Faith?]. 
 270. See infra Table 6. 
 271. See infra Table 6. 
 272. See infra Table 6. 
 273. See infra Table 6. 
 274. See infra Table 6. 
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Table 6.  Hierarchical Logistic Regression Estimating Impact of 
Suspect Race on Probability of a Frisk and/or Search  
(OR, SE, p) 
Characteristic OR SE p 
Age 0.977 (.001) ** 
Female 0.347 (.007) ** 
Suspect Race–Black 1.124 (.018) ** 
Suspect Race–Hispanic  1.045 (.018) ** 
Suspect Race–Asian/Other 0.837 (.021) ** 
Suspect Race–Unknown  0.588 (.018) ** 
Gang Member 1.117 (.017) ** 
Arrest History 1.018 (.001) ** 
Constant 0.459 (.082) *** 
Observations 199,331  
Log Likelihood -121413.72  
Wald Chi-square 2603.82  
p(Wald Chi-square) 0.000  
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by tract.  Fixed effects for police 
districts, year and season.  Random effects for tract characteristics (not 
shown) include tract population (logged), total violent crime in tract (logged, 
lagged), disadvantage index, and Moran’s I.  Race variables contrasted with 
White suspects.  
Significance: + p<=.10, * p<=.05, ** p<=.01
 
Taken together, Tables 5 and 6 show troubling racial disparities in 
the number of repeated FIO contacts and the probability of being 
frisked / searched experienced by Black and Hispanic suspects.275  
The effects in these tables are adjusted for the influences of age, gang 
membership, neighborhood and other relevant non-race influences.  
In fact, we see the frisk estimates in Table 6 as conservative and 
expected to see even greater effects by suspect race considering the 
attention to gangs in this setting and BPD’s use of FIOs for 
intelligence gathering purposes, especially among gang members.  
Other Terry stop “programs” do not document non-contact 
observations, in line with the Supreme Court dicta limiting 
constitutional regulation to the physical aspect of investigative 
stops.276  The large FIO differences in counts of encounters—both 
                                                                                                                                         
 275. See supra Table 5; see supra Table 6. 
 276. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see also Slobogin, supra note 
44, at 22–23. 
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observational and face-to-face—compared to the incidence of frisks 
or searches suggests more extensive use of FIO reports to monitor 
gang members at a distance rather than repeatedly initiating physical 
contact to search them for weapons, drugs, or other contraband.277  
Perhaps this is a safety consideration, or it may be that there are 
information yields from non-contact encounters, such as 
understanding gang membership and associations, that can address 
tactical and policy goals.  Whatever the purpose and rational, more 
research is needed on the reasons and circumstances for this 
component of the FIO strategy, as well as its informational payoff. 
4.  FIO Activity by Unit and Officer Race 
Table 7 shows the effects of officer characteristics on FIO 
patterns.278  There were large differences in FIO activity by officer 
race or ethnicity.  Black officers made 42.5% fewer FIO reports per 
month compared to White officers, controlling for age, sex, rank, 
detective status, and assignment.279  Asian officers also made 
significantly fewer FIO reports.280  Relative to White officers, Asian 
officers made 44.8% fewer FIO reports, controlling for officer 
demographic, rank, and assignment covariates.281  Hispanic officers 
made slightly smaller numbers of FIO reports than their White 
officers but the observed differences were not statistically 
significant.282  Controlling for assignment, rank, and other factors, 
older officers and female officers made significantly fewer FIO 
reports relative to their younger and male counterparts, 
respectively.283 
   
                                                                                                                                         
 277. See supra Table 6. 
 278. See infra Table 7. 
 279. See infra Table 7. 
 280. See infra Table 7. 
 281. See infra Table 7. 
 282. See infra Table 7. 
 283. See infra Table 7. 
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Table 7.  Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Regressions of 
FIO Counts on Officer Characteristics  (IRR, SE, p) 
Characteristic IRR SE p 
Years on Job 0.902 (.007) ** 
Female 0.377 (.069) ** 
Officer Race    
    Black 0.575 (.066) ** 
    Hispanic 0.901 (.156)  
    Asian 0.552 (.121) ** 
Officer Rank     
    Detective 0.885 (.187)  
    Sergeant or Lt. 0.893 (.151)  
    Captain or Command 0.778 (.133) * 
Officer Unit     
    Mobile Operations 1.021 (.583)  
    Drug Control 1.131 (9.263)  
    YVSF 11.953 (2.655) ** 
    Other Patrol 0.358 (.112) ** 
    Other Investigation 0.215 (.069) ** 
Constant 206.322 (49.72) ** 
Zero Inflation Parameters   
    Administrative 
         Assignment 
4.946 (.404) ** 
    On Leave 4.592 (.389) ** 
    Constant -4.734 (.301) ** 
Observations 2,359  
Log Likelihood -9,833.14  
Wald Chi-square 1059.06  
p (Chi-square) 0.000   
Notes: Models estimated with robust standard errors, not clustered due to 
mobility of officers.  Fixed effects for police district, year, season, and 
police district.  
Significance: + p<=.10, * p<=.05, ** p<=.01
 
Unit assignment also was a significant predictor of officers’ FIO 
activity.  BPD officers assigned to the YVSF make almost 12 times as 
many FIO reports per month compared to officers assigned to other 
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specialized units or policing districts, controlling for other factors.284  
Their mission explains in part this emphasis: YVSF officers are 
charged with preventing outbreaks of gang violence.285  Completing 
FIO reports on gang member whereabouts, their associations, and 
routine activities represent a central activity in pursuing that mission 
by massing information on the routine activities of gang members.286 
Compared to line level patrol officers, Captains, Deputy 
Superintendents, and Superintendents make significantly fewer FIO 
reports holding other officer characteristics constant.287  These high-
ranking officers have extensive managerial responsibilities and, while 
they maintain a presence in the community, they are much less likely 
to be engaging in street-level law enforcement work.288 
The heavy influence of the YVSF officers on FIO activity, coupled 
with the race-specific patterns shown in Table 7, leads to a further 
question: whether FIO activity within the YVSF command also varies 
by officer race.  Table 8 shows the results of regressions with only 
officers having one or more FIO encounters, and disaggregating 
officers by race and YVSF assignment.289  The six groups shown in 
Model 2 in Table 8 are compared to Asian and Other Race officers, a 
move that exploits the fact that there are so few Asian officers in the 
YVSF.290  This permits direct comparisons of the regression estimates 
in Model 2. 
   
                                                                                                                                         
 284. See supra Table 7. 
 285. See Manning, supra note 268. 
 286. Id. 
 287. See supra Table 7. 
 288. See supra Table 7. The model used for the estimates in Table 7 is a zero-
inflated negative binomial regression, which is employed in situations where there are 
large numbers of observations of zero events in the data and there are separate 
functions to determine any participation and then frequency of participation. See e.g., 
Kelvin K.W. Yau, Kui Wang & Andy H. Lee, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial 
Mixed Regression Modeling of Over-Dispersed Count Data with Extra Zeros, 45 
BIOMETRICAL J. 437 (2003).  This regression first estimates factors that explain when 
there are one or more events, and then explains the count of those events given one 
or more.  The first stage analyzes the inflation factors associated with any 
participation.  The medical leave and administrative position variables were 
statistically significant predictors of zero FIO activity during the study time period, 
controlling for other factors.  BPD officers who were not able to perform their duties 
or were assigned to administrative positions generally do not complete FIO reports. 
 289. See infra Table 8. 
 290. See infra Table 8. 
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Table 8.  Negative Binomial Regression of the Number of FIO Reports by 
Officer Race and YVSF Status (IRR, SE, p) 
  Model 1  Model 2   
Age  .916 (.006) ** .922 (.006) ** 
Female  .307 (.059) ** .383 (.074) ** 
White Officer  1.752 (.335) ** ----  
Black Officer  1.171 (.243)  ----  
Hispanic Officer  1.613 (.338) * ----  
White YVSF ----  9.022 (2.136) ** 
White Other  ----  1.488 (.287) * 
Black YVSF  ----  8.358 (2.081) ** 
Black Other  ----  .826 (.170)  
Hispanic YVSF ----  10.788 (3.706) ** 
Hispanic Other ----  1.112 (.265)  
Constant   191.969 (37.743) ** 175.144 (34.663) ** 
Observations  1,750   1,750  
Log Pseudo-likelihood -9,245.30  -9,116.84  
Wald Chi-Square     312.99      652.49  
Wald Chi-Square p 0.000  0.000  
Notes: Models estimated with robust standard errors, not clustered due to mobility of officers.  
Officers included in this analysis made at least one FIO report between 2007 and 2010.  Asian is 
the contrast category for the FIO officer race tests.  
Significance: + p<=.10, * p<=.05, ** p<=.01 
 
Model 1 in Table 8 shows, for this narrower sample of officers, that 
White and Hispanic officers had substantially more FIO encounters 
than Black officers.291  Without controlling for assignment, the effect 
size for White officers is more than three times the size for Black 
officers; the effect size for Hispanic officers is more than three times 
the size for White officers.292  Model 2 shows that this effect is an 
artifact of YVSF assignment.293  Within officer race, YVSF officers 
have far more frequent FIO activity than their non-YVSF 
counterparts.294  The differences again are very large.  White YVSF 
officers have about 6.5 times more FIO encounters per month than 
                                                                                                                                         
 291. See supra Table 8. 
 292. See supra Table 8. 
 293. See supra Table 8. 
 294. See supra Table 8. 
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White officers in other units.295  The differences for Black and 
Hispanic officers in the YVSF units are even greater.296 
Here again, we see the importance of the YVSF unit in explaining 
racial disparities in FIO encounters between citizens and police.  This 
is not to say that there is no evidence of racially disparate treatment 
by officers in other commands; the data show that in fact, regardless 
of command, White officers and Hispanic officers are more active in 
FIO work.297  Rather, Table 8 shows that within this focus of police 
efforts, the race disparities within officer racial categories are quite 
large, and officers from all racial and ethnic groups are more active 
once assigned to this command.  The results suggest an institutional 
dimension to explain officer FIO activity that is separate from an 
individual officer’s taste or preference for discrimination. 
5.  Frisks and Searches by Officer Race and Assignment 
Table 9 shows differences in frisk / search probability by officer 
race and assignment.298  Black officers were 15.0% less likely to frisk / 
search subjects during FIO encounters when compared to White 
officers, controlling for age, sex, rank, detective status, and 
assignment.299  Asian officers were also less likely to frisk / search 
FIO subjects.300  Relative to White officers, Asian officers were 32.6% 
less likely to frisk / search subjects during FIO encounters controlling 
for officer demographic, rank, and assignment covariates.301  Hispanic 
officers were only 4.4% less likely to frisk / search subjects during FIO 
encounters holding the other variables constant; that result was not 
statistically significant.302  More experienced officers and female 
officers were significantly less likely to frisk / search subjects during 
FIO encounters relative to their younger and male counterparts, 
respectively, controlling for assignment, rank, and other factors.303 
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2016] STOPS AND STARES 641 
Table 9.  Hierarchical Logistic Regression Estimating 
Impact of Officer Race on Probability of a Frisk or 
Search (OR, SE, p) 
Characteristic OR SE p 
Years on Job 0.973 (.007) ** 
Female 0.618 (.069) ** 
Officer Race    
    Black 0.850 (.066) ** 
    Hispanic 0.956 (.156)  
    Asian 0.674 (.121) ** 
Officer Rank     
    Detective 1.495 (.187)  
    Sergeant or Lt. 0.847 (.151)  
    Captain or Command 0.5 (.133) * 
Officer Unit     
    YVSF 1.243 (2.655) ** 
Constant 315.322 (49.720) ** 
Observations 200,103  
Log Likelihood -123,410.23  
Wald Chi-square 1,618.47  
p (Chi-square) 0.000   
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by police district.  Random 
effects (not shown) included census tract population (logged), total 
crime in tract (logged, lagged), disadvantage index, and Moran’s I.  
Fixed effects for year, season, and police district. 
Significance: + p<=.10, * p<=.05, ** p<=.01  
 
Two assignments show extremely elevated rates of frisk / search 
activity.  Detectives were 49.5% more likely to frisk / search subjects 
during FIO encounters relative to non-detectives, controlling for 
assignment, rank, and other factors.304  Given their responsibility for 
investigating unsolved crimes, detectives were presumably more 
likely to frisk / search FIO subjects for evidence of criminal activity 
during the course of an investigation.  YVSF officers were 24.3% 
more likely to frisk / search subjects during FIO encounters relative to 
non-YVSF officers, controlling for assignment, rank, detective status, 
                                                                                                                                         
 304. See supra Table 9. 
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and other factors.305  YVSF officers focus FIO encounters on gang 
members who pose a higher risk of carrying weapons relative to other 
FIO subjects, which explains in part their preferences for search 
relative to other BPD officers.306  Compared to line level patrol 
officers, Sergeants, Lieutenants Captains, Deputy Superintendents, 
and Superintendents were significantly less likely to frisk / search 
subjects during FIO encounters holding other officer characteristics 
constant. 307 
Despite the frequent FIO activity by YVSF officers, these results 
suggest that they exercise caution in proceeding from an encounter to 
a frisk or search.  YVSF officers were far more active in FIO activity, 
by orders of magnitude, than their non-YVSF counterparts, yet only a 
fraction of their encounters proceeded to a frisk or search.308 
The disparity between FIO encounters by this group and frisks or 
searches could suggest problems in their formation of the requisite 
suspicion necessary to conduct a frisk or search contingent on a stop.  
The high rate of non-frisk encounters suggests a reduced level of 
reasonable suspicion in many encounters that falls below 
constitutional thresholds permitting a frisk—primarily officer safety 
or suspicion of weapon possession—or a search.  Searches require 
probable cause, a stricter standard.309  Another interpretation of this 
gap could simply be that the purpose of YVSF encounters is simply to 
establish contact, to signal to young males under suspicion that the 
police are present and watching, and to gather intelligence.  This may 
be a reasoned activity in terms of policy, but it falls short of being 
reasonable under constitutional requirements for even a momentary 
deprivation of liberty and detention.  ‘Getting it wrong’ at a high rate 
suggests problems in the bases of suspicion animating a stop, a finding 
with implications for constitutional regulation of FIO activity.310 
6.  Officer-Suspect Racial Asymmetries 
The higher incidence of FIO encounters for non-White suspects 
and also encounters initiated by White officers suggest the possibility 
                                                                                                                                         
 305. See supra Table 9. 
 306. See Manning, supra note 268. 
 307. See supra Table 9. 
 308. See supra Table 9. 
 309. See Commonwealth v. Torres, 745 N.E.2d 945, 948 (Mass. 2001) (stating that 
Massachusetts follows constitutional standards in Terry v. Ohio). 
 310. See Floyd v City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(finding that the high rate of unproductive stops was a sign of inaccuracy in the 
formation of reasonable suspicion that is a prerequisite to an investigative stop). 
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of discrimination.  But these results leave open the question of 
statistical versus preference-based discrimination.  Most studies 
testing for discrimination, particularly those analyzing vehicle stops, 
have relied on “hit rates” or the probability of guilt to distinguish 
between these forms of discrimination.  Generally, we assume an 
absence of preference-based discrimination if racial differences in 
police encounters are independent of the race of the police officer.311  
But if there are differences in, for example, the stops of Black 
suspects by White officers compared to Black officers, we might 
conclude preferences for discrimination.  But that evidence alone is 
only a partial explanation.  Those preferences might be explained by 
the greater ease with which officers may be able to approach and 
conduct searches of persons of their own race or ethnicity.  
Alternately, if officers are not randomly assigned to neighborhoods, 
then Black officers in White neighborhoods where crime rates may be 
lower will conduct fewer stops of Whites.  Since crime rates are higher 
in predominantly Black neighborhoods in Boston and other cities, the 
opposite condition would be observed:  White officers would have 
more encounters with Black suspects.  Testing for discrimination 
using these metrics therefore requires not only knowledge of officer 
and suspect race, but also controls for the crime rates of the different 
areas where they patrol and encounter suspects.312 
Table 10a shows the results of analyses that disaggregate patterns 
of FIO encounters by both officer race and suspect race four racial 
groups.313  We estimated models of the count of FIO encounters using 
negative binomial regressions, following the functional form used in 
the previous models of FIO activity.  Controls included age and 
gender of the suspect and age, gender, rank and assignment for 
officers.  Separate models were conducted for each officer race group.  
Fixed effects for police districts controlled for differential exposure of 
officers to crime and to different local racial concentrations.  The first 
three columns compare FIO reports of each suspect racial group by 
                                                                                                                                         
 311. See generally Shamena Anwar & Hanming Fang, An Alternative Test of 
Racial Profiling in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 96 AM. ECON. 
REV. 127 (2006); see also Antonovics & Knight, supra note 146, at 2; Bjerk, supra 
note 146, at 525. 
 312. This approach also discounts the problem of the “suspicious outsider,” or the 
person who crosses neighborhoods of different racial composition. See Antonovics & 
Knight, supra note 146, at 25.  This problem may be more salient in studies of vehicle 
stops where crossing of neighborhood boundaries is more common and feasible.  
Here, our analysis examines pedestrian stops almost exclusively. 
 313. See infra Table 10a. 
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officers of each race to FIO reports done by White officers.314  The 
fourth column compares FIO’s by White officers to FIO reports of 
Black Officers.315  The cells in Table 10a show the incidence rate ratio 
for each comparison.316   
 
Table 10a.  Negative Binomial Regression Analyses of the Joint 
Distribution of Officer Race and Subject Race on FIO Counts  
(IRR, SE) 
          Officer Race 
Subject Race Black Hispanic Asian White 
     
Black .645** .865 .504** 1.548* 
 (.071) (.139) (.112) (.169) 
     
Hispanic .581** .128 .664 1.722** 
 (.063) (.170) (.171) (.188) 
     
Asian / Other .616** 1.219 1.113 1.623** 
 (.089) (.334) (.281) (.235) 
     
White .426** .731* .702* 2.345** 
 (.041) (.103) (.200) (.227) 
Note: Models estimated with robust standard errors clustered by police district.  
Estimates control for suspect and officer age and gender.  Fixed effects include 
year, season, police district, and officer rank and assignment.  White is the 
contrast category for officer race variables in the regressions in the first three 
columns of coefficients.  Black is the contrast category for the White officer race 
dummy variable in the regressions in the fourth column.   
Significance: + p<=.10, * p<=.05, ** p<=.01
 
To test for different discrimination patterns in frisks and searches, 
we use multilevel logistic regression models as the functional form to 
estimate the probability of a frisk or search across racial groups.  The 
results in Table 10b show the odds ratio for each comparison.317 
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Table 10b.  Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analyses of the Joint 
Distribution of Officer Race and Subject Race on the Likelihood 
of a Frisk / Search (OR, SE) 
         Officer Race 
Subject Race Black Hispanic Asian White 
     
Black .813** .922** .649** 1.229** 
 (.014) (.020) (.038) (.021) 
     
Hispanic .991 .968 .605** 1.008 
 (.041) (.040) (.068) (.041) 
     
Asian / Other .949 1.031 .724* 1.052 
 (.060) (.071) (.112) (.066) 
     
White .874** .926* .811** 1.143** 
  (.032) (.035) (.057) (.042) 
Note: Models estimated with robust standard errors clustered by police district.  
Estimates control for suspect and officer age and gender.  Fixed effects include 
year, season, police district, and officer rank and assignment.  White is the 
contrast category for officer race variables in the regressions in the first three 
columns of coefficients.  Black is the contrast category for the White officer race 
dummy variable in the regressions in the fourth column.   
Significance: + p<=.10, * p<=.05, ** p<=.01
 
 Table 10a shows higher FIO activity for White officers for suspects 
of all races, including White suspects, compared to Black officers.318  
White officers have significantly more encounters with White suspects 
than they have with suspects of other races.319  On the surface, this 
suggests greater FIO activity compared to Black officers across all 
suspect race groups, but not preferences for stops of one racial group 
over others.  Column 1 shows that Black officers, compared to White 
officers, are significantly less active across all suspect race groups, 
again suggesting discrimination other than preference-based.320 
However, comparing within-suspect race results across rows, 
suggests preferences for discrimination by White officers.  FIO 
activity Column 4 in Table 10a shows that White officers have about 
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55% more FIO encounters per month with Black suspects compared 
to Black officers.321  Black officers have 35% fewer stops per month of 
Black suspects compared to White officers.322  This between-officer 
within-suspect comparison suggest preferences by White officers 
compared to Black officers in FIO activity for Black suspects.  Similar 
differences are evident between Black and White officers in stops of 
Hispanic suspects, Asian suspects, and White suspects.323 
The pattern for frisks and searches in Table 10b is similar.  White 
officers are more likely to frisk or search both Black and White 
suspects compared to cross-racial frisks or searches by Black 
officers.324  Black officers again show lower rates of frisks and 
searches compared to White officers, and are equally likely to frisk or 
search both White and Black suspects.325  White officers are 23% 
more likely to frisk or search a Black suspect, but Black officers are 
19% less likely to search Black suspects compared to White 
officers.326  Hispanic officers are less likely compared to White 
officers to frisk Black and White suspects, while White officers are 
more likely than Hispanic officers to frisk or search both Black and 
White suspects.327 
One way to understand Table 10a is that while White officers may 
not discriminate between suspects of different races, they do have 
stronger preferences for stops between races than Black officers.  This 
is evident for suspects of all races.  This presents a more complex 
picture of the preference-statistical discrimination distinction than 
previous studies have reported.  White officers are more active than 
are Black or Hispanic officers in FIO activity overall, but they also 
prefer within each separate race to conduct FIOs relative to Black 
officers.  There may not be preferences by race, but there does appear 
to be stronger preferences for FIO activity overall.  Put another way, 
White officers are biased toward everyone compared to Black, 
Hispanic or Asian officers. 
Given the higher rates of FIO encounters by YVSF officers, we 
tested to see if the results in Tables 10a and 10b would be robust to 
the exclusion of those officers.  The results led to the same 
conclusions, with only minor changes in the regression coefficients 
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and standard errors once the YVSF officer were excluded.  We 
observed the same mixed pattern of statistical and preference-based 
discrimination that analyses with the full sample produced.  In other 
words, any preferences that we observed were not limited to that 
active command. 
CONCLUSION 
Two features of Boston’s practices of investigative stops distinguish 
it from the “new policing” regimes in other large cities.  First, Boston 
focuses a significant portion of its field investigation activity on 
suspected and actual gang members.  Boston police have pursued this 
targeted strategy within its FIO activity for quite some time.328 This is 
consistent with the elevated rates of crime, especially youth crime, in 
the neighborhoods with the highest concentration of gang 
members.329  In contrast, New York City’s investigative stop program 
only recently reoriented from widespread investigative stops to a 
more spatially concentrated effort focused on gang activity in public 
housing sites.330  Second, the Boston Terry stop design includes both 
contact encounters and non-contact observations of suspects.  
Intelligence and surveillance may not be unusual in other cities, but 
rarely is there formal recording of observations that do not convert 
into contact encounters.  Boston is distinctive in recording those 
observations in the same database as its contact encounters. 
The records of these encounters provided a basis to assess the 
claims of discrimination that have infected the contemporary practice 
of Terry stops or investigative stops as practiced in the “new 
policing.”  We conducted analyses to assess the allocation of officers 
and FIO activity by neighborhood and suspect race, using metrics and 
methods that were cited in recent litigation on other investigative stop 
                                                                                                                                         
 328. See generally DAVID KENNEDY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUS., REDUCING GUN 
VIOLENCE: THE BOSTON GUN PROJECT’S OPERATION CEASEFIRE SERIES RESEARCH 
REPORT 2 (2001). 
 329. See Deterring Gang Gun Violence, supra note 269, at 2; The Corner and the 
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programs.331  Both crime and race contribute to variations over time 
and place in FIO activity.  The regressions are estimated so that 
effects of each are mutually adjusted.  The results are robust to the 
exclusion of the specialized and very active YVSF gang unit, 
suggesting a generalized pattern of preferences for encounters with 
Black and Hispanic suspects.  We expect a rational allocation of 
police activity to match variation in times and places with local crime 
rates, and we observe that to be the case.  But we also observe a 
marginal effect of racial composition in census tracts, suggesting 
statistical discrimination in those areas. 
The evidence suggests a complex answer to the question of 
whether that discrimination is evidence of bias.  Using a racial 
mismatch model, we find that White officers were consistently more 
active than Black or Hispanic officers in conducting FIO reports, 
regardless of suspect race.  But within suspect race, the preference of 
White officers to FIO Black suspects is far greater than Black officers’ 
preference to FIO Black or Hispanic suspects.  And Black officers are 
less likely to FIO a White suspect than is a White officer.  These 
patterns are robust to the exclusion of YVSF officers, which suggests 
that the results also are robust to the exclusion of gang members. 
Is this evidence of bias, or preference-based discrimination?  The 
data are not well suited to answer this question.  We defined 
statistical discrimination as a rational decision to focus efforts on one 
group or to exclude another group from engagements of any sort.  
Following Gary Becker’s notion of discrimination, officers who 
stopped Black or Hispanic suspects more often perceived a net 
benefit in the form of increased attention to crime detection.332  As a 
matter of efficiency, attention to populations with a lower probability 
of return would sacrifice the returns in crime control from allocating 
attention to the presumed higher rate group.  Becker also identifies 
discrimination based on tastes or values, where the decision maker 
discounts known facts.333  In the case of FIO activity, decision makers 
may inflate crime propensity beyond its true value, leading to a 
subjectively rational but still preference-based form of discrimination.  
In our study, the marginal rate of FIOs by census tract based on racial 
                                                                                                                                         
 331. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). See 
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2016] STOPS AND STARES 649 
composition after controlling for local crime rates may reflect that 
type of process.  It suggests that subjective evaluations of the returns 
from a FIO encounter may be inflated based on race-based 
distortions of information. 
Kenneth Arrow described this process as “positive valuation” of 
one group with higher expected return, even if that valuation is 
inflated.334  Arrow describes sources of “cheap information” that 
might help a decision maker to identify a discrimination target a low 
cost: skin color, poor neighborhoods, or other substitutes for crime.335  
These sources of cheap information may also prime decision 
makers—police officers, in this case—to increase their valuation of 
the suspect’s behavior.  Since there is no cost for a wrong decision, 
there are only weak incentives to correct or update that information. 
Using the officer-suspect racial mismatch metric, the results suggest 
preference-based discrimination.  But without additional evidence of 
the outcomes of FIO encounters, or the reasonable suspicion bases 
animating these events, we cannot fully explain the motivations for 
FIO encounters.  These encounters may be efficient, or they may 
simply be a form of routine administrative searches based on actuarial 
suspicion in the absence of individualized or particularized 
suspicion336 or a clear expectation of arrests or seizures of weapons.337  
These encounters may simply reflect an institutional bias or norm 
based on a closed system of information that reinforces command 
staff and individual officers’ prior beliefs about whom to observe or 
engage, setting aside questions of fairness or efficiency.  FIOs here 
may be based on location, peer network, or other actuarial markers 
that substitute for individual markers of suspicion, raising Fourth 
Amendment concerns.  Explaining how those factors translate into 
                                                                                                                                         
 334. See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN 
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 336. See Eve Bresinke Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 
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perceptions, decisions, attributions or behaviors requires different 
research designs.338 
Still, evidence of officer race disparities suggests that there is more 
than just statistical discrimination or institutional preference at work 
here.  That these stops disproportionately target minority suspects in 
non-White neighborhoods beyond what local crime rates predict, 
raises Equal Protection concerns that seem to be collateral 
consequences of the “new policing.” 
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